Le 21/06/2016 à 06:19, Paul Syverson a écrit : > We published a design in 2010 that essentially turns a > solution against a passive adversary into a solution against an active > adversary. It had some nice theoretical properties, but I don't think > it was practical. These haven't been ruled out. There is ongoing > research, but so far none of it has looked adequately useful in practice.
Probably you are referring to the paper mentioned in https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-June/041192.html which indeed as I commented does not look realistic to implement, then I suppose that the answer to my question is no > I think there are some things we maybe could do with mixing and > synchronization to raise the bar at least a little against a _passive_ > adversary. I have told many researchers my thoughts about this, but so > far nobody has taken it up that I know of. I would like to look into > it myself, but I already have a many-years backlog of more important > (more likely to make a real difference IMO) research questions to > answer. Would be interested to know what are those thoughts (on or off the list) and/or get possible links to them -- Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
