To be honest, I guess that I must stop using Tor!!!! It is not secure.I can remember that in torproject.org the Tor speaking about some peole that use Tor. For example, reporters, Military soldiers and...But I guess all of them are ads. Consider a soldier in a country that want send a secret letter to his government and he want to use Tor but the country that he is in there can sniff his traffic :(
On Monday, November 7, 2016 10:34 AM, Seth David Schoen <sch...@eff.org> wrote: Jason Long writes: > Not from ISP!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! It is so bad because ISPs are under > governments control. If an ISP can see I use Tor then it is a good evidence > in censorship countries.You said " If a government is running the bridge, it > will know where the users are who are using that particular bridge.", In your > idea it is not silly? I mean was it and Tor must ban it. My point is that people in other countries could still benefit from these services, especially if they don't mind as much that the government of a country where they don't live knows something about their Tor traffic. For example, if I live in Germany, maybe I am more comfortable with my Tor circuits going through Iran, compared to someone who lives in Iran who is unhappy about that. Both people might agree that the Iranian government probably spies on the Tor network in a way they disagree with, but the person who lives in Iran may see this as a very practical important thing to worry about, while the perhaps who lives in Germany may think it's not as practically important. Or maybe someone living in Argentina is trying to hide their location from a particular person, but not from the government, and doesn't really mind if their data goes through Tor nodes in their own country. If you're using bridges to hide the fact that you use Tor at all, you need some way to know if the particular bridges and technologies you use can accomplish that goal. That might include knowing the person or organization who runs the bridge that you use. If you use bridges that are run by unknown people, you get a much greater risk that those bridges are maliciously tracking your use of Tor, regardless of what country they're physically located in. I totally agree that surveillance by ISPs and governments is very serious and very disturbing. Tor's design is partly about letting people use resources that are "somewhere else" so that perhaps they're not under surveillance by the user's own government or ISP, or aren't all under surveillance by the same people. This will probably work less well overall if the Tor developers try to single out particular countries as extra-bad so that they can't participate in Tor at all. That would mean fewer countries overall participating in Tor, and an easier time for people trying to do surveillance in the somewhat-less-bad countries. And it would mean fewer choices for users about where to send their traffic. One thing that might be useful would be a way for Tor users to actively pick what jurisdictions (or fiber optic cables or Internet exchange points) they do or don't want their data to pass through, and have the Tor client respect those preferences. This is helpful both because individual Tor users believe different things and because they have different threat models. I believe there's an old mechanism in the torrc configuration file to avoid using nodes in particular countries, but very few Tor users use this or understand how to use it. Maybe it could be made clearer and more convenient and integrated with the Tor Browser interface in some way. -- Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk