I have compiled the usensord binary based on current solution.
I did some tests and it works well.
Since settings part is not ready, I am using below command to change the 
property whose default value is 0(means not vibrate).
dbus-send --session --print-reply --type=method_call 
--dest='com.canonical.usensord' /com/canonical/usensord/haptic 
org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties.Set string:"com.canonical.usensord.haptic" 
string:"OtherVibrate" uint32:1

Code is here: https://code.launchpad.net/~zhangew401/usensord/fix-lp-1433590
and the logic is
do vibration for OSK always.
do vibration for others only when the property is 1(means enabled in settings)

The property is saved in file, /home/phablet/.config/usensord/prop so
that it will be restored after factory reset.

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1433590

Title:
  apparmor dbus denial for org.freedesktop.Accounts and make Other
  vibrations work

Status in Canonical System Image:
  Triaged
Status in apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu package in Ubuntu:
  Fix Released
Status in ubuntu-system-settings package in Ubuntu:
  Confirmed
Status in ubuntu-ui-toolkit package in Ubuntu:
  Confirmed
Status in usensord package in Ubuntu:
  In Progress

Bug description:
  This affects vivid and (somewhat recently?) 14.09.

  At some point, apps started to request access to
  org.freedesktop.Accounts for something, but I'm not sure what. It has
  been conjectured in this bug that it is due to vibration settings.
  Filing against ubuntu-system-settings for now, but please feel free to
  move to the correct package.

  This happens with webapps:
  Apr  7 08:42:17 ubuntu-phablet dbus[797]: apparmor="DENIED" 
operation="dbus_method_call"  bus="system" path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts" 
interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable" member="Introspect" mask="send" 
name="org.freedesktop.Accounts" pid=2632 
profile="com.ubuntu.developer.webapps.webapp-facebook_webapp-facebook_1.0.26" 
peer_pid=1596 peer_profile="unconfined"
  Apr  7 08:42:17 ubuntu-phablet dbus[797]: apparmor="DENIED" 
operation="dbus_method_call"  bus="system" path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts" 
interface="org.freedesktop.Accounts" member="FindUserById" mask="send" 
name="org.freedesktop.Accounts" pid=2632 
profile="com.ubuntu.developer.webapps.webapp-facebook_webapp-facebook_1.0.26" 
peer_pid=1596 peer_profile="unconfined"

  and QML apps:
  Apr  7 08:43:40 ubuntu-phablet dbus[797]: apparmor="DENIED" 
operation="dbus_method_call"  bus="system" path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts" 
interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable" member="Introspect" mask="send" 
name="org.freedesktop.Accounts" pid=3377 
profile="com.ubuntu.calculator_calculator_1.3.339" peer_pid=1596 
peer_profile="unconfined"
  Apr  7 08:43:40 ubuntu-phablet dbus[797]: apparmor="DENIED" 
operation="dbus_method_call"  bus="system" path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts" 
interface="org.freedesktop.Accounts" member="FindUserById" mask="send" 
name="org.freedesktop.Accounts" pid=3377 
profile="com.ubuntu.calculator_calculator_1.3.339" peer_pid=1596 
peer_profile="unconfined"

  The following rules allow the requested access:
    dbus (send)
         bus=system
         path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts"
         interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.{Introspectable,Properties}"
         member=Introspect
         peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Accounts,label=unconfined),
    dbus (send)
         bus=system
         path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts"
         interface="org.freedesktop.Accounts"
         member=FindUserById
         peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Accounts,label=unconfined),
    dbus (send)
         bus=system
         path="/org/freedesktop/Accounts/User[0-9]*"
         interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties"
         member=Get
         peer=(name=org.freedesktop.Accounts,label=unconfined),

  However, the above is too lenient and constitutes a privacy leak for
  apps. FindUserById could be used by a malicious app to enumerate
  usernames on multiuser systems and because we can't mediate method
  data with apparmor, the Get() method can be used to obtain any
  information provided by this interface.

  The following can be used to see what can be leaked to a malicious app:
  gdbus introspect --system -d org.freedesktop.Accounts -o 
/org/freedesktop/Accounts/User`id -u phablet`

  This can be solved in a couple of ways:
  1. add whatever information the app is trying to access to a new helper 
service that only exposes things that the app needs. This could be a single 
standalone service, perhaps something from ubuntu-system-settings, that could 
expose any number of things-- the current locale, if the locale changed, if the 
grid units changed, the vibration settings, etc. Since this service wouldn't 
have any sensitive information, you could use standard dbus 
properties/Get()/etc 
  2. add a new dbus API to an existing service such that apparmor rules can 
then be used to allow by method (eg, GetVibration() or something)

  I won't dictate the implementation except to mention that '1' seems
  like something generally useful and I believe that it was something
  the ubuntu-system-settings devs were already looking at for detecting
  locale changes without rebooting.


  Original description
  starting an app in vivid (image 135 on arale currently)

  produces a bunch of dbus denials in syslog ... (there is also a
  /dev/tty one but i think this is just because soemthing tries to write
  an error to console ... so transient)

  http://paste.ubuntu.com/10620834/

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