On 1/5/2017 2:20 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > I'd rather give up features (eg policy sessions, if necessary) for the > unpriv fd than give up security of the unpriv fd.
Please don't give up policy. Nearly every use case of that we think of for TPM 2.0 uses policy sessions. E.g., In 1.2, PCR authorization was built in to the object. In 2.0, it's a policy. In 1.2, key types were restricted to certain commands. In 2.0, it's a policy. Then there are all the new use cases - time restricted keys, use count restricted keys, keys with a PIN, etc., all use policy. Even use of the EK primary key requires a policy, and that's needed for salt (getting the first password in securely) and attestation (proof that the TPM is authentic). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Developer Access Program for Intel Xeon Phi Processors Access to Intel Xeon Phi processor-based developer platforms. With one year of Intel Parallel Studio XE. Training and support from Colfax. Order your platform today. http://sdm.link/xeonphi _______________________________________________ tpmdd-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/tpmdd-devel
