On 1/30/2017 11:04 AM, James Bottomley wrote: > > This depends what your threat model is. For ssh keys, you worry > that someone might be watching, so you use HMAC authority even for a > local TPM.
If someone can "watch" my local process, they can capture my password anyway. Does using a password that the attacker knows to HMAC the command help? > In the cloud, you don't quite know where the TPM is, so again you'd > use HMAC sessions ... however, in both use cases the sessions should > be very short lived. If your entire application is in the cloud, then I think the same question as above applies. If you have your application on one platform (that you trust) and the TPM is on another (that you don't trust), then I absolutely agree that HMAC (and parameter encryption) are necessary. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot _______________________________________________ tpmdd-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/tpmdd-devel
