Dmitry,
My replies are inline. sorry that my mail program renumbered each of
your bullets as I inserted my replies :-(.
Hello Stephen,
Here is my understanding of the question you asked.
Let Ben or Rob fix me if I'm wrong.
1.
Anybody is allowed to operate log. But there should be a procedure
(similar to CA/Browser forum) which is determined to register log
as "important" (we need a better word). There should be not many
"important" log servers, I suppose --- otherwise we are to get the
same problem as we have with many CAs.
As you note, the notion of establishing some logs as "important" would
borrow from the
CABF, but we're the IETF and this is intended to be an IETF standard.
So, I think this
doc needs to address this issue in a fashion consistent with IETF
procedures.
1.
Any log-server can select the list of acceptable CAs. I think that
"important logs" should cover all the CAs supported by major browsers.
The doc suggests this, but again, this has a CABF feel to it. IETF
standards do not endorse
implementations and use decisions by vendors to drive standards.
1.
Any log server can select the algorithm of hash for Merkle Tree
and for its key signing the SCTs.
That's not what the doc says; it establishes two MTI algs that all
clients must support, while log operators are allowed to pick form
between the two. This seems a bit backwards to me, in that it imposes
the greater burden on the larger # of implementations.
1.
Each browser should provide an editable way of managing logs. By
default it should be a reasonable subset of "important" logs.
The set of "important" logs might not include a CA that is important for
a set of clients 9since log operators have complete discretion as to
which CAs they accept) so it ought to be possible for a client to
include a pointer to logs outside the default set.
1.
Each CA can be accepted by more than one log.
"Might be" is the more accurate characterization, based on the current
doc. There is no requirement that any log operator accept submissions
from a specific CA. Each log operator indicates what CAs/TAs it supports.
1.
Browsers should
1.
allow user to accept the cert without CT providing warning
about absence of CT
2.
allow user to specify absence of log for this or that domain
(non-public suffix)
3.
allow user to a particular log for this or that domain and
return an error if there is no SCT for id provided by this log.
4.
there should be a procedure of report about log misbehaviour
in case of invalid log records
These seem like reasonable suggestions, at least to begin, but none of
them appear in the doc.
I worry that, absent a description of minimum browser management
interfaces for CT, we have no sense of whether users will be able to
deal with incremental deployment.
1.
I think that warning is acceptable in case of an absence of SCTs,
but in case of cryptographic errors the error should be generated.
I presume you mean that if there is a crypto error, the cert should be
rejected, a hard fail, right?
Steve
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