Eran,
Following a discussion about correlating SCTs to certificates (ticket
23 <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/23>):
My understanding is that any intermediate CA certificate may be logged
(either as a Precertificate or after issuance) *in addition* to the
end-entity certificate.
RFC6962 only requires TLS clients to validate SCTs for server
certificates (presumably end-entity certificates), so SCTs for any
intermediate is not very useful.
6962 is experimental, so it's not binding. It's what this new doc says,
when approved by the WG
and the IESG, that counts.
The only case I see where an intermediate CA certificate is logged
*instead* of a CA certificate is when a Name-Constrained intermediate
CA cert is logged.
I think you mean to say "The only case I see where an intermediate CA
certificate is logged *instead* of an EE certificate ..." right?
In light of this, it seems that ticket 23 can be solved by specifying
that TLS clients check all non-embedded SCTs against the end-entity
certificate or the intermediate certificate with extension OID
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.7.
This statement isn't as clear as it needs to be, since it talks about
what a client does for a
non-embedded SCT. Does a TLS client check an SCT that it encounters
embedded in a CA cert?
Steve
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