On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:44:57PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Mon, 20 Oct 2014, Linus Nordberg wrote:
>
> as individual without chair hat...
>
> > Logs MUST verify that the submitted end-entity certificate or
>
> >My intention was to make the specification less restrictive by changing
> >
> > Logs MAY accept certificates that have
> > expired, are not yet valid, have been revoked, or are otherwise not
> > fully valid according to X.509 verification rules in order to
> > accommodate quirks of CA certificate-issuing software.
>
> That seems to bring up the topic a bit too broadly I think? How about:
>
> Logs MUST protect themselves against spam. They MAY require a
> fully validated X.509 certification chain to one of their configured
> trusted root CA's.
I prefer a more broad wording:
Logs MAY reject certificate submissions which would compromise the
integrity or availability of the log. An example of a valid reason to
reject a submission would be an attempt to "spam" the log with large
numbers of certificates, consuming all its storage space and/or
processing capacity. Logs MUST NOT reject certificates for any other
reason.
I'm willing to compromise a little on that last sentence, but I've seen some
comments recently that suggest that some people think CT logs are a
validation checker, not an activity log, so it'd be nice to clarify that in
the spec.
- Matt
--
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from Mozart's Requiem. "Where do you want to go today?" is on the screen,
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Translation: "The damned and accursed are convicted to the flames of hell."
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