On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 2:16 PM, Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> wrote: > My idea isn't fully formed yet, but... > > Wildcard certs are more risky than normal certs since the CA doesn't know > exactly what they are securing. All they know is the secured base level > domain. Therefore, I think the public has a strong interest in knowing when > a wildcard cert was issued v. a standard FQDN cert. However, I'm not sure > there's much more risk to end certificate requester - they still know > everything that's been issued for their domain. It certainly doesn't make > life easier for the CT operator or CA, but it gives important information to > the relying parties looking at certs. If they look up a cert in the CT log, > they'll be able to easily identify if the entire domain is secured by the > same, logged cert.
I was thinking similarly. I propose that labels containing a "*" may not be redacted, as the "*" effectively is redaction. Additionally, if the left most label is exactly "*", then it is considered redacted for the purposes of determining if the label to the right may be redacted. That would allow *.?.?.example.com to be an allowable redaction. I would also recommend that the right most two labels AND any labels making up a "public suffix" not be allowed to be redacted. I'm not sure if this should go into 6962bis or the policy of clients, auditors, and monitors, but the redacting these effectively nullifies the reason for CT as far as I'm concerned. Thanks, Peter _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
