Please send/post corrections.
Paul, WG Status update
Charger unchanged; need to reset milestone.
Eran RFC6962-bis status+
Still needs some tweaks. Suggests waiting for Google to finish their
implementation to clean out all nits before WGLC
A log cannot do a single v1/v2 log, must run both in parallel.
Recently closed tickets 4, 64, 68, 69, 72, 81, 73, 65, 91, 80, 86, 90, 82, 83,
84, 92, 89, 58; 63, 74, 76, 77, 70; See tracker for details
Open tickets 78 (alg agility needs more description) 83 (should require
deterministic ECESA) 96 (dynamic metadata; does only CA root list really
change?) 95 (include get-entries response size in the log metadata, for
cursoring through a log)
Steve raised issue of exposing what certs a client is interested in if size of
get-entries can shrink to one, for example.
More on open: 87 (ref to attack model doc) 64 (remove spec of sig and hash
lags) 93 (monitor description inconsistencies) 94 (when/why clients should
fetch inclusion proofs)
Stephen raised issue fhat if threat analysis is normative, schedule gets pushed
out further. Should be informative.
Steve Kent, attack model
Name changed on doc, even if filename can't easily be changed. Not a threat
model, we don't know what the attackers are thinking, but we do know possible
actions so it's an attack model.
Includes an intro to CT, he prefers it move into an arch document but if not it
will stay.
"CT is a set of mechanisms, designed to detect, deter, and facilitate
remediation of certificate mis-issuance"
Semantic mis-issuance: name in the cert refers to an entity incorrectly.
Syntactic mis-issuance: violation of certificate profile(s) that apply.
Reviewed a taxonomy of attacks. Read the doc. Discussion of additions and
bigger picture needs.
Incorporated all (but one) comments.
Wants WG agreement via list on goals, definitions, attacks.
We have a half-dozen people commit to read and review the document.
Ben agrees about having an arch doc; Steve and Ben will collaborate on an arch
doc
Dkg, Gossip
Gossip important to keep logs accountable by making sure everyone sees the same
append-only data and keep their MMD/SCT promises.
Works by browser's sharing and comparing SCT and STH
Three channels:
SCTFeedback; browser sends cert/sct to website, website sends to
auditing function/third-party auditor
STH Pollination: auditor/website send STH to each other. STH are not
privacy-sensitive
Optional Trusted Auditor: browser passes sct/cert to auditor (e.g., the
DNS resolver since it already knows what you might be looking at)
Call for adoption is on the mailing list.
Dkg, CT for binary
Goal is to know that you are running the same software as "everyone else," not
guaranteeing that the software isn't compromised.
Add a binary lLogEntryType; add binary and binary_digest to Signed_Type
Many details of what and how is signed are still open; need feedback from s/w
distributors.
PHB suggest to not use ASN.1
Discussion and agreement that changing the s/w distribution format is a
non-starter.
Rich Salz, selective logs
Some logs will not log every single cert from the CA's in their root list.
What do we do?
Discussion, no conclusion.
--
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: [email protected] Twitter: RichSalz
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