On Tue, 29 Sep 2015 at 16:52 Stephen Kent <[email protected]> wrote: > Rob, > > > ... > >> I appreciate the desire to avoid unnecessary bloat, but if that causes > >> us to have > >> to rely on procedural security measures instead of algorithmic ones, I'm > >> not > >> convinced that the tradeoff is a good one. > > Procedural security measures? > I thought I recall someone suggesting that the move to an OID (vs. > key/hash) > would require that someone(?) check to make sure that a log operator didn't > re-use the same key with a new log instance. I'd call that a procedural > secruity > measure. >
This is true even if you use hashes, surely? For example, an old key (from a log no longer known to someone) could be reused. Or a key for a log that was never used publicly. Or the same key could be used for two logs accepted by different clients. And so on.
_______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
