On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 3:02 PM, Stephen Farrell
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On 31/10/16 19:01, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:37 PM, Melinda Shore <[email protected]> 
>> wrote:
>>> You may have seen the recent announcement from the Chrome
>>> team that as of October 2017 certificates will need to comply
>>> with Chrome's CT policy in order to be trusted.  There was
>>> also an invitation to discuss that on the trans mailing list.
>>> This is a reminder that mailing list discussions need to
>>> remain focused on the specifications being produced by the
>>> working group - that is to say, policies related to
>>> individual implementations are out of scope for the working
>>> group except to the extent that they bear on decisions related
>>> to our working group drafts.
>>
>> Paul and Melinda,
>>
>> Do you consider discussion of use cases for privacy to be in-scope for
>> this group or do you consider only the technical implementation of
>> privacy (e.g. section 4 of 6962-bis and the redaction draft) to be
>> in-scope?
>
> (Wearing no IETF hat, but perhaps the hat of someone interested
> in privacy...)
>
> I do not believe that it makes sense for us to talk as if
> privacy was a concept that applies to corporate entities.
>
> I do believe that your text above conflates privacy (a human
> concept) with corporate secrecy (a useful but different thing)
> in ways that are in the end damaging to both. (I further and
> even moreso believe that such conflation would be damaging
> to the IETF were we to slip into the bad practice of not
> calling out that terminological sloppiness.)
>
> I totally get that redaction has utility for folks who need
> corporate secrecy on a temporary basis. I absolutely do not
> accept that that has any privacy aspect.
>
> Can you call out the privacy aspect that applies to humans
> and that is a real part of the question related to support for
> redaction in CT?

There are certificates that have personal information (e.g. given
name, surname, and physical location) in the subject distinguished
name or the subject alternative names.  It is very possible that there
may be a desire to redact this information (in fact it could even be
required in some jurisdictions as CT could be considered a database).
We already see this with domains in many countries where the full
registrant details are not publicly available.

Additionally, while 6962-bis does focus on certificates used for TLS
server authentication, there are other types of certificates that
could be logged.  For example a certificate that is used with email
and contains both the email address and given/surname.  It might be
that the owner of the certificate only wishes to disclose this binding
to people receiving email from them rather than publicly disclosing
it.  We have also seen requests for certificates that cover phone
numbers.  A similar situation would apply -- having an "unlisted"
number should be possible, where the subject details (other than phone
number) are only known to a group of people who communicate with the
number.

So I think there is a privacy aspect here in addition to any corporate
secrecy aspect.

Thanks,
Peter

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