On Mon, Mar 6, 2017 at 1:06 AM, Peter Bowen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > 2) Logging certificates to a CT log is optional. An unlogged > certificate may not be accepted by some clients or relying parties, > but is not a mis-issued certificate. > > Rationale: While some might want to see 100% logging, it is clear > there is not currently support for making it mandatory. Just to be clear, I think you're saying there is not currently support by *any* client or relying party for making non-logging equivalent to misissuance. That is different than saying that there is not currently broad support across the client/RP ecosystem for refusing to accept non-logged certificates. > 7) The only entity that knows if a certificate for their domain was > not supposed to be issued is entity who was the domain registrant at > the time of issuance. > > Rationale: While others can guess based on heuristics, only the > registrant can say with authority "I think this was unauthorized" > While this is true, including Andrew's caveats, this does risk unintentionally implying that the only benefit to CT that must be considered when discussing redaction proposals is that of detecting certificates issued without proper domain validation control. CT provides broader benefits than that, some of which are implied by Andrew's notes about automatable detections of BR Violations. Some benefits can also be seen in the identification of undisclosed cross-signatures that create gaps in the audited PKI that can range from small to tremendously large. -- Eric > > Thanks, > Peter > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans > -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone>
_______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
