On Thu, Sep 7, 2017 at 3:24 AM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 5 September 2017 at 18:46, Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 9:04 AM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 4 September 2017 at 00:17, Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi folks, >>>> >>>> Please find enclosed the first cut of my AD review of this draft. >>>> >>>> Note: the original of this review is on Phabricator at: >>>> >>>> https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D13 >>>> >>>> If you want to see comments in context -- which is a lot easier -- you >>>> can go there. Also, you can create an account and respond inline if >>>> you like. If you elect to, let me know if you run into problems. >>>> >>>> -Ekr >>>> >>>> >>>> Note: I have not yet reviewed the algorithms in S 2.1. I plan to do >>>> that separately, but figured it would be useful to provide the rest of >>>> my review on the assumption that the changes to that section will be >>>> modest if any. >>>> >>>> >>>> High-Level: >>>> >>>> 1. This document makes a variety of claims about the assurances that >>>> clients get that only obtain if some as-yet-to-be-specified >>>> third-party verifiability mechanism is implemented. For instance, in >>>> the intro: >>>> >>>> Certificate Transparency aims to mitigate the problem of misissued >>>> certificates by providing append-only logs of issued certificates. >>>> The logs do not need to be trusted because they are publicly >>>> auditable. >>>> >>>> >>>> As the extensive discussion following Richard Barnes's and my previous >>>> comments should make clear, this is only a property of CT if you also >>>> have some mechanism for third-party verifiability of STHs, and this >>>> document does not supply that. In the actually deployed -- we can >>>> debate deployable separately the deployability of some of the >>>> proposals for how to get this-- versions of CT, what clients get is >>>> SCTs, which are effectively countersignatures and in fact do require >>>> trusting the logs. This is implicitly acknowledged by proposals that >>>> RPs only accept certificates with >1 SCT. >>>> >>> >>> The purpose of multiple SCTs is to avoid the death of a single log >>> causing the death of a large number of certificates. It is not about trust. >>> >> >> That seems like the reason for the server to offer it, but not for the >> client to require it. >> >> Line 763 >>>> Maximum Chain Length: The longest chain submission the log is >>>> willing to accept, if the log chose to limit it. >>>> Nit: chooses >>>> >>> >>> Past tense seems correct? >>> >> >> I'm willing to dert this to the RFC Editor. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 785 >>>> accepted trust anchor, using only the chain of intermediate CA >>>> certificates provided by the submitter. >>>> Why is this a 2119 MUST? It seems wise, but not necessarily a >>>> conformance requirement >>>> >>> >>> "To avoid being overloaded by invalid submissions" >>> >> >> There seem like one way to prevent this, but not the only one. >> >> >> >>> Line 816 >>>> anchor used to verify the chain (even if it was omitted from the >>>> submission). The log MUST present this chain for auditing upon >>>> request (see Section 5.6). This prevents the CA from avoiding blame >>>> What happens in cases of multiple chains. For instance, say that the >>>> submitter provides superfluous certificates? >>>> >>> >>> Not allowed. >>> >> >> Hmm... So your theory is that the submitter does path construction >> > > Yep - and that's borne out by practice. >
OK, well, then it would help if the document were clearer on this point. > >> > >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 837 >>>> opaque LogID<2..127>; >>>> This seems to be the first use of the TLS specification language, but I >>>> don't see a cite. Please provide one, >>>> >>> >>> See s1.2. >>> >> >> OK. Thanks. >> >> >> >>> >>>> Line 926 >>>> opaque TBSCertificate<1..2^24-1>; >>>> NIT: there's no actual way a TBSCertificate can be 1 byte. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 948 >>>> "tbs_certificate". The length of the "issuer_key_hash" MUST match >>>> HASH_SIZE. >>>> Is this true? What happens if we have two CAs that share a key? >>>> >>> >>> Eh? >>> >> >> Say that a CA spins up two subordinates that happen to share the same >> key. I agree it's foolish. >> return an empty >> >> >> >>>> Line 1522 >>>> permissible. These entries SHALL be sequential beginning with the >>>> entry specified by "start". >>>> How does the client know which of the above two cases has occurred? >>>> >>> >>> The response includes an STH, which says how big the tree is. Probably >>> should be the latest one known to that server. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1552 >>>> TLS servers MUST use at least one of the three mechanisms listed >>>> below to present one or more SCTs from one or more logs to each TLS >>>> This needs to somehow be clear that it only applies to TLS servers that >>>> are compliant with this specification, as it's not a new requirement on all >>>> TLS servers. >>>> >>> >>> Surely its the other way round: i.e. new requirements on all TLS servers >>> have to be made clear? >>> >> >> I'm not sure what you mean. This document does not get to require that >> all TLS servers do CT. Was that your intent? >> > > What I meant is that if every time you mention a thing you have to say > "but only if you are conforming to this RFC" then you a) make the whole > thing a lot more cumbersome, b) are stating the obvious (i.e. that you only > have to conform to the RFC if you have decided to conform to the RFC). > I don't think it's merely stating the obvious in that we have *other* RFCs which actually do attempt to retrospectively impose requirements on all uses of TLS. See, for instance: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465. And this is a different story, in that we are not (I assume) going to go around saying that TLS stacks that don't do CT are not TLS conformant. I think the text I would use here would be "CT-using TLS servers MUST..." Surely if you are making a new requirement for TLS compliance then you have > to explicitly say so? > Well, my point is that the way that this document is written in fact does so, and so you have to look at "Updates" to find out that that's not the case. -Ekr > > > >> >> -EKr >> >> >>> >>>> Line 1595 >>>> been struck off for misbehavior, has had a key compromise, or is not >>>> known to the TLS client). For example: >>>> Maybe replace "For example:" with "Some ways this can happen are..." >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1599 >>>> misissuance from clients. Including SCTs from different logs >>>> makes it more difficult to mount this attack. >>>> Assuming that the server is malicious, why would it include multiple >>>> SCTs? It seems like requiring multiple SCTs does in fact provide this >>>> defense, but that's not an argument for servers to provide multiples. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1627 >>>> SerializedTransItem trans_item_list<1..2^16-1>; >>>> } TransItemList; >>>> Structurally, it's kind of a mess to have this be the place that you >>>> make TransItems self-contained (by having a defined length field). What >>>> about other places I might want to concatenate TransItems. Why don't you >>>> instead make TransItem self-contained, like so: >>>> >>>> struct { >>>> VersionedTransType versioned_type; >>>> uint16 length; // NEW >>>> select (versioned_type) { >>>> case x509_entry_v2: TimestampedCertificateEntryDataV2; >>>> case precert_entry_v2: TimestampedCertificateEntryDataV2; >>>> case x509_sct_v2: SignedCertificateTimestampDataV2; >>>> case precert_sct_v2: SignedCertificateTimestampDataV2; >>>> case signed_tree_head_v2: SignedTreeHeadDataV2; >>>> case consistency_proof_v2: ConsistencyProofDataV2; >>>> case inclusion_proof_v2: InclusionProofDataV2; >>>> } data; >>>> } TransItem; >>>> This is pretty much the universal TLS convention. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1649 >>>> 6.4. transparency_info TLS Extension >>>> This extension appears not to have any explicit support for CT entries >>>> for intermediate certs. Am I just supposed to glue together all the >>>> TransItems? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1651 >>>> Provided that a TLS client includes the "transparency_info" extension >>>> type in the ClientHello, the TLS server SHOULD include the >>>> You need to provide an actual definition of what the client includes, >>>> and having the server ignore the contents is bad mojo. TLS convention is >>>> for the client to include an empty extension and the server to validate >>>> that it is in fact empty. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1654 >>>> "transparency_info" extension in the ServerHello with >>>> "extension_data" set to a "TransItemList". The TLS server SHOULD >>>> ignore any "extension_data" sent by the TLS client. Additionally, >>>> IMPORTANT: The normative language here is kind of confusing. It SHOULD >>>> include the extension but if it's included, it MUST consist of >>>> TransItemList, no? And surely only SHOU >>>> Also, I'm not sure this is the right logic. If the server knows that it >>>> has the SCT information in the certificate or in OCSP, why SHOULD It send >>>> this extension. I would think, rather that servers should aim to send >>>> information at most once, so that it should only send the extension if it >>>> contains information that's not in the cert/OCSP. as it pretty much has to >>>> send those anyway. Otherwise, don't we just end up in a world where if this >>>> info is in OCSP and certs, it's always sent twice, because the client >>>> doesn't know where the info is, and so has to always offer the extension. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1658 >>>> session is resumed, since session resumption uses the original >>>> session information. >>>> Does this mean the client MUST abort the handshake if the server >>>> includes it? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1668 >>>> o The TLS client includes the "transparency_info" extension type in >>>> the ClientHello. >>>> This condition is non-sensical, because if the client *doesn't* include >>>> the extension, the server cannot send the transparency_info extension at >>>> all. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1722 >>>> 8. Clients >>>> Given the imminent standardization of TLS 1.3, you need to somehow >>>> provide a mapping for client-side CT for that, I think >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1739 >>>> view. The exact mechanisms will be in separate documents, but it is >>>> expected there will be a variety. >>>> Given the somewhat science fictional status of Gossip, this entire >>>> paragraph should be stricken >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1747 >>>> MUST implement all of the three mechanisms by which TLS servers may >>>> present SCTs (see Section 6). TLS clients MAY also accept SCTs via >>>> the "status_request_v2" extension ([RFC6961]). TLS clients that >>>> IMPORTANT: This also needs to be rewritten so it makes clear it's not a >>>> general levy on TLS clients. >>>> >>>> Line 1770 >>>> In addition to normal validation of the server certificate and its >>>> chain, TLS clients SHOULD validate each received SCT for which they >>>> have the corresponding log's parameters. To validate an SCT, a TLS >>>> IMPORTANT: Why is this a SHOULD and not a MUST? If you support CT at >>>> all, why would you not do this? >>>> >>>> Line 1791 >>>> TLS clients MUST NOT consider valid any SCT whose timestamp is in the >>>> future. >>>> What's the reason for this? If your clock is slightly wrong, this is >>>> going to cause new certs to fail even if they otherwise would have >>>> succeeded (because the notBefore and notAfter are more conservative). >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1800 >>>> will disclose to the log which TLS server the client has been >>>> communicating with. >>>> IMPORTANT: This "Note" just mentions in passing a huge privacy issue. >>>> You need to be a lot clearer about this. >>>> >>>> Line 1823 >>>> "transparency_info" and "status_request" TLS extensions in the >>>> ClientHello. >>>> IMPORTANT: This is not consistent with the requirements on the server. >>>> Trying to reconstruct the reasoning here, the client can only decide >>>> that the server is noncompliant if it has given the server a chance to send >>>> the SCTs by every mechanism., otherwise the server might just want to send >>>> the SCT some other way. However, if servers can optionally ignore >>>> transparency_info (it's a SHOULD above), then you can have two compliant >>>> implementations with the server having a CT-compliant cert and yet the >>>> client declares it noncompliant. To fix this, you need to require the >>>> server to respond to "transparency_info" >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1831 >>>> "CachedObject" of type "ct_compliant" in the "cached_info" extension. >>>> The "hash_value" field MUST be 1 byte long with the value 0. >>>> You should explain why this is one byte long (that the PDU is defined >>>> as having a minimum length of 1). Also the server should be required to >>>> check it. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1842 >>>> watches. It may also want to keep copies of entire logs. In order >>>> to do this, it should follow these steps for each log: >>>> Why is this not a 2119 SHOULD? >>>> >>>> Also, what does "in order to do this" refer to? Clearly not how to keep >>>> copies.... Presumably, how to poll the log. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1864 >>>> 8. Either: >>>> IMPORTANT: You seem to be missing there part where you actually look at >>>> the entries to verify that they don't contain bogus data (e.g., >>>> certificates for your domain). I get that it's implicit here, but given >>>> that you provide an algorithm, that should be an explicit stage. >>>> This is a pretty odd algorithm. If I understand it correctly, 1-4 are >>>> setup steps and then 5-9 is supposed to be repeated, but I could just do >>>> this once and stop at 4. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1912 >>>> STHs it receives, ensure that each entry can be fetched and that the >>>> STH is indeed the result of making a tree from all fetched entries. >>>> IMPORTANT: How do you verify MMD? >>>> >>>> Line 1944 >>>> If it should become necessary to deprecate an algorithm used by a >>>> live log, then the log should be frozen as specified in Section 4.13 >>>> and a new log should be started. Certificates in the frozen log that >>>> RFC 2119 SHOULD? Isn't this a MUST, though? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 1958 >>>> "transparency_info" TLS extension. IANA should update this extension >>>> type to point at this document. >>>> IMPORTANT: You'll need to fill in the new field specified in >>>> https://tlswg.github.io/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates >>>> /#rfc.section.6 >>>> >>>> Line 2009 >>>> | | ECDSA (NIST P-256) | | >>>> | | with HMAC-SHA256 | | >>>> | | | | >>>> Why are you defining both algorithms? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 2150 >>>> (with the intention of actually running a CT log that will be >>>> identified by the allocated Log ID). >>>> This seems like it's not a great thing to be asking an expert to do, as >>>> it seems to require business arrangements. Is it really that valuable to >>>> save a few bytes here? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 2163 >>>> that the log has misbehaved, which will be discovered when the SCT is >>>> audited. A signed timestamp is not a guarantee that the certificate >>>> is not misissued, since appropriate monitors might not have checked >>>> IMPORTANT: This is not correct, because the client does not know that >>>> the monitors are verifying the data that it is. See my general comments on >>>> public verifiability above. >>>> >>>> Line 2182 >>>> operating correctly. As a log is allowed to serve an STH that's up >>>> to MMD old, the maximum period of time during which a misissued >>>> certificate can be used without being available for audit is twice >>>> Nit: up to the MMD old >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 2211 >>>> compute the proofs from the log) or communicate with the log via >>>> proxies. >>>> This also seems quite handwavy in light of the facts on the ground. >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 2237 >>>> and STHs can be stored by the log and served to other clients that >>>> submit the same certificate or request the same STH. >>>> This needs to be expanded. Who is this risk against? The log or someone >>>> else? If the log, what's the logs incentive? >>>> >>>> >>>> Line 2243 >>>> reduce the effectiveness of an attack where a CA and a log collude >>>> (see Section 6.1). >>>> See my comments in 6.1 about this. >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Trans mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans >>>> >>>> >>> >> >
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