On 24/12/2018 23:52, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Mon, 24 Dec 2018, Eric Rescorla wrote: <snip> >> COMMENTS >> S 6.5. >> > o The TLS server sends a modified Certificate message (as >> described >> > in section 4.1 of [RFC7924]). >> > >> > If the "hash_value" of any "CachedObject" of type >> "ct_compliant" sent >> > by a TLS client is not 1 byte long with the value 0, the >> CT-using TLS >> > server MUST abort the handshake. >> >> Note: this isn't really a hash, so we should probably acknowledge >> that. > > Sure, I think one of the author's can clarify that.
Proposed text: https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-rfcs/pull/303 -- Rob Stradling Senior Research & Development Scientist Sectigo Limited _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
