Thanks Watson. Appreciate the response. 1. We can surely argue critical or non-critical. Named constraints can be critical or non-critical 2. Constraints are defined on Issuing CA as per RFC 5280. See below RFC extract. 3. One of the CT issue is that the persona used to build the solution is thinking of only an application developer, site operator. The cloud scenario is a miss - The scenario is that I want to deploy my application in ~100 regions worldwide. I want to deploy my application at the same time across the world. 4. Wildcard - just search or google it and there are numerous articles conveying the issue with wildcards.
A question from my side : What is the role of this WG ? 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints The name constraints extension, which MUST be used only in a CA certificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located. Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is acceptable. -----Original Message----- From: Watson Ladd <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 6:56 PM To: Rashmi Jha <[email protected]> Cc: Eran Messeri <[email protected]>; Paul Wouters <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-31 On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 6:51 PM Rashmi Jha <[email protected]> wrote: > > Name constraints itself if orthogonal to CT but both of these achieve the > same goal. Restrict a CA to issue certs for the domains they are suppose to. > The difference is following : > > In CT, you log the cert into CT logs at the time of issuance of each > cert Name constrained is upfront where CA declares that I am going to issue > certs only for ford.com, jaguar.com (hypothetically) and that’s it. Criticial name constraints are I think still a nonstarter. > > > > Named constraints CA shouldn’t need to log each time when a cert is issued. > Because the verification and monitor of whether the CA has complied with the > goal is done offline or a different time in both the scenarios. Are we talking about roots are are we talking about intermediates? Because the following fun can happen: 1: Honest Achmed's trusted CA isues Dubious Constrained Intermediate with name constraints for "example.com" 2: Dubious Constrained Intermediate issues cert for example.com Crucially Honest Achmed isn't actually honest and that cert is going to do terrible things. CT catches the issuance, name constraints do not. > > > > The draft doesn’t address what should be an alternative for folks who > don’t want CT > > CT adds burden for each certificate issuance. It adds ~7seconds to every cert > issuance and it adds a new failure endpoint in the path. What application has this delay be a problem and requires trust by browsers? (Which again this WG doesn't deal with). > CT has 0 alternatives. There is no mechanism for redaction. > > (The only alternative to have subdomain level redaction is to use > wildcard which is just from the list of ‘what not to do’s’ in PKI. ) Wildcards are supported just fine. What's the application where this is a problem? > > > > CT drives an important industry-wide goal. There are other ways to achieve > the same goal. And for organizations where each millisecond matters, the user > agent should support an alternative rather than add load and failure point at > their critical path of issuance. Named constraints is within the books of > PKI. A CA can be held accountable like any other CA/Browser baseline > requirements that if they issue certs outside of their constraints then they > should take immediate action or get distrusted. It won’t be any different > from a CA doing a wrong thing and got caught via CT monitors. > > > > This draft should prescribe an alternative to achieve the same goal which is > achieved by CT and the details on that alternative can be covered somewhere > else. > > > > Thanks, Rashmi Jha. > > > > From: Eran Messeri <[email protected]> > Sent: Thursday, June 20, 2019 3:10 AM > To: Paul Wouters <[email protected]> > Cc: Rashmi Jha <[email protected]>; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [Trans] draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis-31 > > > > Paul made the point quite accurately - CT is orthogonal to name-constraining > a CA, and can be used to validate the CA has adhered to the constrained names. > > > > Additionally, there's no way to signal to a user agent that such a CA would > be "exempt" from CT (some user agents have Enterprise controls to allow > instances managed by the organization to not require CT for certain domains, > though). > > > > On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 12:44 AM Paul Wouters <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, 19 Jun 2019, Rashmi Jha wrote: > > > Have you looked into the options of not requiring CT for CAs which > > are constrained to a brief list of domains ? I understand this was > > considered in the past but couldn’t find details why this was not accepted. > > Whether or not to require CT is not part of the document. This seems > more like a question to browser vendors. The draft only states: > > > In addition, if TLS clients will not accept unlogged certificates, > then site owners will have a greater incentive to submit certificates > to logs, possibly with the assistance of their CA, increasing the > overall transparency of the system. > > The "if" there is important. It is not a decision made in this > document or this Working Group. > > The draft only lists the requirements and formats for when CT is used. > > > Named constraint by default provide the assurance as to what domains they > > will issue. CT becomes an additional network call in in issuance of > > certificate which can be prevented. > > Not "assurance", but "expectation". CT is there to confirm this > expectation. Surely, you want CT logs to show captured certificates > that were signed by a CA outside of that CA's own Named constraint policy? > > Additionally, if you skip accepting certificates within a named > constraint, what do you do when some CA claims ".com" as their named > constraint? > > Paul > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > [email protected] > https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww. > ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftrans&data=02%7C01%7Crashmij%40mic > rosoft.com%7C48af4c32534d4f589b8008d6f9d9796a%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d > 7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636971109771716859&sdata=97MDIyztKi8%2FGCc6IZ > urR1%2Bjgt7LF0BnQ7pHnIZNs%2Fw%3D&reserved=0 > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > [email protected] > https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww. > ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftrans&data=02%7C01%7Crashmij%40mic > rosoft.com%7C48af4c32534d4f589b8008d6f9d9796a%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d > 7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C636971109771716859&sdata=97MDIyztKi8%2FGCc6IZ > urR1%2Bjgt7LF0BnQ7pHnIZNs%2Fw%3D&reserved=0 -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
