Hi,
I support the adoption/standardization of this draft, use case seems real.
Informal review per request, comments:
1. Could probably use a text review prior to the next step. One or
two sentences can be tightened up:
a. 2.2 item 3 ("The TLVs in an extensible Address Flush message are .. ")
b. typo in 2.2.8 (type = 8 vs 7 in figure).
2. The draft gives a number of ways to specify an address flush e.g.
various ways specify vlans, FGLs and MAC addresses (e.g. lists
blocks, bitlists). Do we know if valid use cases for all these ways of
specifying a flush? Also, for block specifiers what happens if there
are overlapping blocks?
3. With a TLV length of 8 bits you cannot really specify more than
192 FGLs and 42 MAC addresses. Are multiple TLVs of the same type
allowed? Instead, would it make sense to have a longer TLV length
field of say 16 bits?
4. It looks like a spoofed address flush can be used to mount a denial
of service attack. If that is protected by encryption or by perimeter
security, it might be good to explicitly call this out in Section 4,
Security Considerations.
thanks,
Ramkumar
[trill] Working group LC on draft-ietf-trill-address-flush-03 (10/2 - 10/16)
Donald Eastlake <[email protected]> Mon, 02 October 2017 23:11 UTCShow header
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=trill#>
This begins a 2 week WG LC on draft-ietf-trill-address-flush-03.txt.
Please indicate if you think the draft is ready for publication and is
useful for TRILL deployments.
Thanks,
Donald
(WG Secretary for the Chairs: Sue Hares & Jon Hudson)
===============================
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
[email protected]
Replies:
- [trill] 答复: Working group LC on draft-ietf-trill-address-flush-03
(10/2 - 10/16)
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/trill/WPuFWUtnsbt_KsrM27dRPygXZBM>
zhangdacheng <[email protected]>
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