Hi Mirja, On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Mirja Kuehlewind (IETF) <i...@kuehlewind.net> wrote: > > Hi Donald, > > sorry for my late reply. Please see below. > > > Am 04.04.2018 um 20:10 schrieb Donald Eastlake <d3e...@gmail.com>: > > > > Hi Mirja, > > > > On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 10:58 AM, Mirja Kühlewind <i...@kuehlewind.net> > > wrote: > >> Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for > >> draft-ietf-trill-over-ip-16: Discuss > >> > >> ... > >> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> DISCUSS: > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >> Usage of encapsulation schemes > >> ---- > >> The document does not clearly explain and justify why different > >> encapsulations > >> are needed. The document should more extensively discuss the different > >> properties and trade-offs for each encapsulation and give clear > >> recommendations > >> when you to use which encapsulation. E.g. the document does not clearly > >> specify > >> when to use IPSec (besides saying „if security in needed“), however, the > >> document needs to explain more clearly what is meant by this: given the > >> over-the-Internet path is always not trusted, does that mean that IPSec > >> should > >> always be used in that scenario? Why is IPSec specified instead of using > >> TLS or > >> DTLS with the TCP or UDP encapsulations respectively? > > > > More information can be added about properties of different encapsulations. > > > > In the latest revision (-16), Appendix A was added (page 48) briefly > > discussing the IP security decision: (1) Is the information presented > > in Appendix A sufficient? (2) Would you like that material moved into > > the body of the document. > > Sorry, I actually missed that appendix. So, yes, I think further guidance > needs to be provided in the body and not only explaining why IPSec was > selected (focusing on the technical point(s) and not so much on the wg > process behind it) but more importantly you need to give more detailed > guidance when it needs to/should be used.
OK. > Also, what you mean by "Other security protocols can be used by agreeing > TRILL over IP transport ports“? Perhaps the sentence you ask about was completely superfluous but I don't understand what question there is on its meaning. If there is agreement by the end points of the connection and, instead of the mandatory to implement IPsec they decide to use something else like DTLS or SSH, they can certainly do that. > >> Why is both UDP and TCP > >> encapsulation needed, given that UDP is the default that is mandatory to > >> implement anyway? Why are the short-comings of UDP and when is it > >> recommended/beneficial to switch to TCP? > > > > I would say that the primary problem with UDP is fragmentation. > > That is a good point but given that UDP is the mandatory, and only mandatory > to implement solution anyway, you need to address the fragmentation problem > anyway. In this case it is still not very clear when it is beneficial to > negotiate TCP instead. We'll see what we can add but it seems unreasonable, in the absence of field experience, to demand that this document should precisely indicate when which option should be used. > >> DSCP > >> ----- > >> 1) Section 4.3 should also talk about decapsulation as DCSP is often > >> overwritten on the path and therefore the DCSP of the inner and other IP > >> headers can differ on decapsulation. Please see RFC2983 for further > >> guidance. > >> You probably should specify to discard the outer DSCP at tunnel egress in > >> your > >> use case. > > > > OK. > > > >> 2) Further it is not clear to me if the use of CS7 in appropriate for this > >> use > >> case as RFC 4594 says " o CS7 marked packets SHOULD NOT be sent across > >> peering points. > >> Exchange of control information across peering points SHOULD be > >> done using CS6 DSCP and the Network Control service class." > > > > Although providing generally similar guidance, I note that RFC 8100 is > > a more recent Informational RFC on this topic than RFC 4594. > > RFC8100 is only on guidance for interconnected networks. So I would say > RFC4594 is actually the more general reference. Anyway the recommendation is > the same. > > > > We can add some guidance that CS6 and CS7 should not be used for > > traffic being sent through provider facilities. I believe that > > essentially all providers that would be adversely affected by such > > traffic provide their own DSCP mapping at their permitter. In any > > case, a TRILL campus operator might want to map DSCP themselves before > > giving traffic to a provider to reduce the probability of provider > > mapping. > > Yes, please do. > > >> 3) Moreover, if my understanding is correct, the high priority classes in > >> TRILL > >> are not exclusively reserved for control data. However, CS6 and CS7 is only > >> meant for control and rounting traffic. If those classes are used it must > >> be > >> ensure that the traffic send with these DSCP is not overloading the > >> network. I > >> think further (security) considerations are needed here. > > > > Current TRILL documents recommend use of the highest available > > priority for messages affecting the establishment and maintenance of > > adjacency and the next highest priority for other important control > > messages (see Section 8.2 of RFC 7780). In case where CS6 and CS7 are > > not available, this advice would still apply, it is just that a lower > > priority might the be highest available. > > > > We can also add something to the Security Considerations. > > Please do. > > >> Broadcast Link Encapsulation Considerations > >> ------ > >> Not every transport encapsulation can be used for Broadcast/Multicast. TCP > >> cannot be used. This is mention later but also be consider in the text in > >> section 5.3 > > > > OK. > > > >> TCP Encapsulation > >> ----- > >> If my understanding is correct than TRILL does not know that the connect > >> of a > >> TRILL data packet is. That means the data could can also contain traffic > >> that > >> is running over TCP, right? Encapsulating TCP in TCP should generally > >> avoided > >> if possible and need further considerations as loss in the outer control > >> loop > >> that is used on the TRILL IP link appears as strongly varying delays to the > >> inner control loop and therefore can have very negative effects. > > > > We can add further considerations on this topic. > > Please do! > > >> TCP Connection Establishment (section 5.6.1) > >> ----- > >> This section seem to assume for all configured or discovered tunnel > >> endpoints > >> should immediately (at node start up time) and permanently open > >> one/multiple > >> TCP connections. I'm in general uncertain if this is the right approach. > >> However, even if the connection is not closed, it might not be usable > >> after an > >> idle time, as middlebox on the path may have removed their state. > >> Therefore, to > >> keep a connection permanently open, the endpoint need probably to send > >> keep-alives, or alternative a mechanism to detect such a failure (quickly) > >> and > >> re-establish the connection such be used. Alternative, a connection could > >> be > >> open and closed when needed. In this case also more recommendation is > >> needed > >> when to open and close the connection(s). > > > > BFD is the mechanism provided in TRILL [RFC7175] to detect failures > > more rapidly than would be detected by IS-IS Hellos. We can add some > > recommendations on this issue. > > TCP is a connected protocol, so you might just receive a RST at some point > and the connection is gone. Yes, that is detectable immediately, but it seems to me you want some delay before trying to re-establish. I was talking about failures detected by traffic not getting through. > Further if you don’t use the TCP connection for a while (often 30 minutes or > hours) it might tear down your network state e.g. at a NAT and you will just > not be able to send any packets anymore. That’s a different problem then > detecting route failures. You need either to send keep-alive (which TCP > provides), or only open and close TCP connection when needed, or provide > guidance on when and who has to reestablish the connection if it happens to > not work anymore for any reason. Without further mechanisms, TRILL over IP will not establish any adjacencies through any NAT that is changing IP addresses so there will not be any such TCP connections. However there might be firewalls or whatever that do not change IP addresses and have this time-out problem so we should talk about it. > >> Fragmentation > >> ---- > >> The fragmentation problem for Internet links is not sufficiently addressed. > >> trill requires a minimum size of 1,470 bytes while most Internet paths only > >> support an MTU of 1,470 bytes which will automatically lead to > >> fragmentation > >> when encapsulation is added. It can not be assumed that all Internet path > >> support IPv6, therefore the recommendation "if fragmentation is anticipated > >> with the encapsulations specified in this document, the use of IPv6 is > >> RECOMMENDED" is often hard to realize. I assume that many trill IS-IS > >> packets > >> are smaller than 1,470 bytes thus fragmentation might not occur, however, > >> for > >> larger packets I would rather recommend to implement an additional > >> mechanism to > >> enable segmentation above UDP (+ PMTU discovery) or the use of TCP. In any > >> case > >> more clear recommendation is needed. > > > > We can add further material on MTU and look into a protocol for > > fragmentation and re-assembly over a TRILL hop. > > Please do! > > >> Port assignment > >> ---- > >> Only one port per service can be assigned (see principles in rfc6335 and > >> guidelines in rfc7605). Therefore the spec should be changed to the use of > >> one > >> ports and describe how different kinds of packets can be distinguished by > >> other > >> means (which should be easily possible to my understanding). Further, it is > >> expected that the document confirms that any new security added later on > >> will > >> also use the port assigned (i.e., future versions will not be eligible for > >> new > >> ports e.g. for a “TLS” variant). > > > > We will respond separately to the port request review comments we have > > received. > > Ok. > > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> COMMENT: > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >> Editorial coments: > >> 1) It is really confusing that the whole document is talking about ports as > >> tunnel endpoints while it also often talks about transport (TCP/UDP) > >> ports. It > >> makes it really hard to read this document. Maybe these things can be > >> better > >> distighlished somehow. > > > > I'm sorry but I don't understand what is confusing. Most of the > > occurrences of "transport" were added recently. As far as TRILL is > > concerned, the (possibly multi-point to multi-point) TRILL over IP is > > just a type of link between TRILL switch ports. > > Because a "transport port" is the thing in the transport header that > indicates the source and destination ports. It’s just a terminology collision > that gave me a hard time at the beginning. I can try to reduce or eliminate occurrences of "transport port". > >> 2) This document should not re-specify the UDP header (5.4). At minimum the > >> text should be changed the following way. OLD "Where he UDP Header is as > >> follows:" NEW "Where he UDP Header is as follows as specified in [RFC0768] > >> :" > > > > OK. Thanks, Donald =============================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell) 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA d3e...@gmail.com > Thanks! > Mirja > > > > Thanks, > > Donald > > =============================== > > Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell) > > 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA > > d3e...@gmail.com > _______________________________________________ trill mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trill