> The weak point of DREs is that the capture of the voters intent > becomes ephemeral immediately. Even paper "audit trails" are one step > removed from the vote.
I agree that DREs are bad. Let's focus on the feasability of an open source system that would replace current optical scan systems, something which would spit out a completed ballot or ballots for the voter to deposit in the tabulator. > Sure it's feasible technically, but it's only one small facet of > verifying the trustworthiness of the overall system. Agreed. > Actually, the full quote, in context is: <snip> > So, it's not just eyes on the source code that is important in finding > and fixing cases where the software doesn't seem to do what it should > be doing. Another important aspect is people TESTING the code. > > My experience, gained through 30+ years as a professional software > developer, is that testing is FAR more important than code inspection > as a way of flushing out software problems. I fail to see how this is problematic in developing the system. Of course you would want to test it. How did Diebold do _their_ tests? Surely you don't think a large enough pool of skilled, interested linux-istas would be incapable of matching that. > > I think we can restate that here, since what's important is that we > > get eyeballs of all political stripes, leanings, persuasions, etc. > > You're right that _most_ people aren't going to know what to look for > > in the source code, but that's hardly necessary if what you're talking > > about is the software that runs the tabulator. > > I would think that this is exactly where it's necessary, and insufficient. it == testing? > Access to the source code > only really comes into it's own when the bug has been detected and the > goal is to eradicate it. Who's doing the testing on a closed-source, proprietary system? Am I supposed to trust her/him/them more than an open development community? Regardless of the process that brings us the voting system, I'd like to be able to MIStrust all of the _individuals_ who took part in its creation and implementation and still trust the system. I think that could be done with a closed-source, proprietary system, but making it open is an undeniable step towards that ideal system. I'm not saying open source is a a panacea. > It's not just the version of the software, but the versions of and > trust in all of the tools in the chain from compilation through > execution. One of the problem with voting software is that it might > not be wise to trust the developers of the products which capture and > count the vote. This is slightly different from the problem of > protecting from attacks from the outside. We need to think about all > of the ways in which a determined political operative working in one > of the vendors of voting equipment might provide for obfuscated back > doors. I couldn't agree more. Perhaps I should have stated more clearly that I envisioned an open source _system_, not just open source software running on the tabulator. > > the spectacular failures on the part of Diebold and its underlying > > proprietary core <snip> > > One thing which should give anyone who is thinking seriously about > protecting the validity of elections pause, is what kind of failures > Diebold's systems really were. > > Were they failures because the systems were trying to protect the > integrity of the electoral process and failed, or were they failures > because the systems were trying to hide a corruption of the electoral > process but provided evidence of that corruption. > > I'm not sure which one it was. This dilemma SHOULD be a bi-partisan concern. Agreed, but why wait for the national parties to get in gear before starting work on an alternative? Why not start designing a system that will build in safeguards against these and other attacks? This country could certainly use people with 30+ years of experience with systems. > I'm not saying that this is a bad idea. However I think that it's MUCH > harder, both technologically and politically than it appears on the > surface. Wussy. If anybody really wants to help, here's a great place to start: http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ There's also the BBV website, but the forums http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ there are a lot to wade through. -CMP -- Cristobal M. Palmer UNC-CH SILS Student [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] ils.unc.edu/~cmpalmer "Television-free since 2003" -- TriLUG mailing list : http://www.trilug.org/mailman/listinfo/trilug TriLUG Organizational FAQ : http://trilug.org/faq/ TriLUG Member Services FAQ : http://members.trilug.org/services_faq/
