On Tue, Jan 03, 2017 at 04:17:06PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2017-01-03 at 16:40 -0700, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > I'm not disputing your analysis, just remarking that it seem very > > undesirable to ban *all* sign-only keys just to support a single > > legacy SSL configuration. > > It's not just a single situation. MD5-SHA1 is where it will fall apart > on backwards compatibility but my current TPM doesn't understand > anything other than sha1 or sha256, so it wouldn't allow more state of > the art algorithms like sha224, sha384 or sha512 either. Okay, yes, that is horrible :( If it is that bad it might not be worth the effort.. > I'm just not sure I see enough benefits to trying to preserve the > decrypt vs sign distinction, whereas I do see the floods of complaints > from users who got it wrong or think it should work as advertised. I probably wouldn't change the process for key generation - make the tools default to decrypt keys and have an advanced option for sign-only. Jason ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, SlashDot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot _______________________________________________ TrouSerS-tech mailing list TrouSerS-tech@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/trousers-tech
