On 2 January 2014 19:34, Dmitri Toubelis <[email protected]> wrote: > You could use Tspi_TPM_StirRandom() before every key generation to work > around Dual_EC vulnerability.
I mentioned StirRandom in the very email you replied to. :-) But in any case trust isn't an on-off thing in my opinion. I can trust the TPM chip to be a layer keeping my keys safer, without necessarily having the same trust in its key generator. I remember seeing an article recently that said for a certain class of US government crypto devices all keys are generated at the NSA, and are sent to these devices. I'm told TPM 2.0 will include support for what I want to (be able to) do. In the mean time I'm happy with StirRandom and then generating the keys in hardware. I wrote a blog post about it about a month ago: http://blog.habets.se/2013/11/Should-I-generate-my-keys-in-software-or-hardware tl;dr: Hardware -- typedef struct me_s { char name[] = { "Thomas Habets" }; char email[] = { "[email protected]" }; char kernel[] = { "Linux" }; char *pgpKey[] = { "http://www.habets.pp.se/pubkey.txt"; }; char pgp[] = { "A8A3 D1DD 4AE0 8467 7FDE 0945 286A E90A AD48 E854" }; char coolcmd[] = { "echo '. ./_&. ./_'>_;. ./_" }; } me_t; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Rapidly troubleshoot problems before they affect your business. Most IT organizations don't have a clear picture of how application performance affects their revenue. With AppDynamics, you get 100% visibility into your Java,.NET, & PHP application. Start your 15-day FREE TRIAL of AppDynamics Pro! http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=84349831&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ TrouSerS-users mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/trousers-users
