Chris has it all right about TPM quotes. David Li <[email protected]> writes:
> My understanding is first the OS reporting PCR values has to be > trustable. It's typically on a separate machine in a secure site or a > specially built kernel image stored on a tamper-proof card that can be > plugged in when necessary. Just to be clear, the OS running on the machine directly connected to the TPM is untrusted. Remember, it could have been booted from an image that contains code inserted by the adversary. The key point to observe is a tainted kernel cannot tamper with a TPM quote or productively modify PCR values. Therefore, a remote party can rely on the quote to determine if the local machine booted from a modified image. > Secondly the PCR values would be reported back together with a > signature signed by the AIK (private key) inside the TPM so the secure > OS can verify it. > > These two conditions combined would allow an user to verify the > reporting. John ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Comprehensive Server Monitoring with Site24x7. Monitor 10 servers for $9/Month. Get alerted through email, SMS, voice calls or mobile push notifications. Take corrective actions from your mobile device. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154624111&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ TrouSerS-users mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/trousers-users
