Devs --A change shipped last week that limited the number of times a user could access the account/verify_credentials method [1] in a given hour. This change proved hasty and short-sighted as pointed out by the subsequent discussion [2]. We apologize to any developer that was adversely affected. Given the problems, we want to fix this in a public and transparent manner. Like most web services, we limit the number of attempts users can make to login to their accounts on Twitter.com to prevent brute force dictionary attacks. This same security is not extended to the platform and leaves accounts vulnerable to the same method of attack through the API.
The change we shipped to limit user accounts to 15 calls an hour to the account/verify_credentials method [1] was intended to mitigate this risk. It was thought to limit the number of tests a potential attack could run in the hour, even in a distributed fashion. However, we only protected a single resource which still leaves all other authenticated methods exposed as a vector of attack (limited only by the API rate limit). Our thinking is now that we will limit the total number of unsuccessful attempts to access authenticated resources to 15 an hour per user per IP address. If a single IP address makes 15 attempts to access a protected resource unsuccessfully for a given user (as indicated by an HTTP 401), then the user will be locked out of authenticated resources from that IP address for 1 hour. This scheme has all of the positive effects that we need, however we want to make sure that we have thought through all of the potential problems on the developer's side before we proceed with this change. Please contribute to the subsequent discussion if you have an opinion or concern. Once we come to an agreement, we will update with details and a timeline for shipping this update. 1. http://apiwiki.twitter.com/Twitter-REST-API-Method%3A-account%C2%A0verify_credentials 2. http://groups.google.com/group/twitter-development-talk/browse_thread/thread/b057014336ff502b Regards, Doug
