Hi Igor, Jens,
Can you please comments on next topics:
1. With enabled A/B partitions, we have boot_a/boot_b,
system_a/system_b, vendor_a/vendor_b partitions. Therefore
requested_partitions[] should be slotted (which is done in this RFC
patch). But this patch doesn' handle item (2) below.
2. With dynamic partitions enabled, we don't have system/vendor
anymore; instead we have single "super" partitions. Therefore
requested_partitions[] table contains wrong partitions list for
that particular case.
Question: can we allow user to select which partition to verify, instead
of trying to verify hard-coded partitions from requested_partitions[]
table? This would solve both (1) and (2) items. But I'm not sure about
next possible issues:
a. Wouldn't it break chain of trust somehow?
b. Is it ok to run avb_slot_verify() several times (one time per one
partition?
If (a) or (b) is of any concern, then maybe we can provide a way for the
user to pass any number of arguments to 'avb verify', like this:
=> avb verify boot_a super_a dtbo_a
so help synopsis for 'avb verify' can be like this:
avb verify <partition> ...
What do you think about this? Which would be the best course of action
to fix both issues (1) and (2)?
Thanks.
Signed-off-by: Sam Protsenko <[email protected]>
---
cmd/avb.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cmd/avb.c b/cmd/avb.c
index 3f6fd763a0..d1942d6605 100644
--- a/cmd/avb.c
+++ b/cmd/avb.c
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
AvbSlotVerifyData *out_data;
char *cmdline;
char *extra_args;
+ char *slot_suffix = "";
bool unlocked = false;
int res = CMD_RET_FAILURE;
@@ -244,9 +245,12 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
}
- if (argc != 1)
+ if (argc < 1 || argc > 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
+ if (argc == 2)
+ slot_suffix = argv[1];
+
printf("## Android Verified Boot 2.0 version %s\n",
avb_version_string());
@@ -259,7 +263,7 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
slot_result =
avb_slot_verify(avb_ops,
requested_partitions,
- "",
+ slot_suffix,
unlocked,
AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_RESTART_AND_INVALIDATE,
&out_data);
@@ -419,7 +423,7 @@ static cmd_tbl_t cmd_avb[] = {
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_part, 5, 0, do_avb_read_part, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_part_hex, 4, 0, do_avb_read_part_hex, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(write_part, 5, 0, do_avb_write_part, "", ""),
- U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(verify, 1, 0, do_avb_verify_part, "", ""),
+ U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(verify, 2, 0, do_avb_verify_part, "", ""),
#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_pvalue, 3, 0, do_avb_read_pvalue, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(write_pvalue, 3, 0, do_avb_write_pvalue, "", ""),
@@ -462,6 +466,7 @@ U_BOOT_CMD(
"avb read_pvalue <name> <bytes> - read a persistent value <name>\n"
"avb write_pvalue <name> <value> - write a persistent value <name>\n"
#endif
- "avb verify - run verification process using hash data\n"
+ "avb verify [slot_suffix] - run verification process using hash data\n"
" from vbmeta structure\n"
+ " [slot_suffix] - _a, _b, etc (if vbmeta partition is slotted)\n"
);
--
2.20.1
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