Hi All,
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 05:19:53PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address
and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy <j-keer...@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <s...@chromium.org>
---
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++---
include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives
the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox
U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan,
the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb
("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index")
[2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10
("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in
of_get_address")
[3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0
WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0
#0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154
#1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index
drivers/core/ofnode.c:262
#2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index
drivers/core/ofnode.c:290
#3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata
drivers/net/sandbox.c:422
#4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407
#5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399
#6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565
#7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38
#8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867
#9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362
#10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a)
#11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)
Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32
in frame
#0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index
drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access at offset 32
partially overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00
0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1
0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00
0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==5996==ABORTING
