Hook into the autoboot flow as an alternative to the existing
mechanisms.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Jaeckel <jaeckel-fl...@eyet-services.de>
---

 common/Kconfig.boot | 23 +++++++++++++---
 common/autoboot.c   | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/Kconfig.boot b/common/Kconfig.boot
index 9c335f4f8c..59fec48c5d 100644
--- a/common/Kconfig.boot
+++ b/common/Kconfig.boot
@@ -802,10 +802,16 @@ config AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION
        depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED
        help
          This option allows a string to be entered into U-Boot to stop the
-         autoboot. The string itself is hashed and compared against the hash
-         in the environment variable 'bootstopkeysha256'. If it matches then
-         boot stops and a command-line prompt is presented.
-
+         autoboot.
+         The behavior depends whether CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is enabled or not.
+         In case CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is enabled, the string will be forwarded
+         to the crypt-based functionality and be compared against the
+         string in the environment variable 'bootstopkeycrypt'.
+         In case CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is disabled the string itself is hashed
+         and compared against the hash in the environment variable
+         'bootstopkeysha256'.
+         If it matches in either case then boot stops and
+         a command-line prompt is presented.
          This provides a way to ship a secure production device which can also
          be accessed at the U-Boot command line.
 
@@ -843,6 +849,15 @@ config AUTOBOOT_KEYED_CTRLC
          Setting this variable provides an escape sequence from the
          limited "password" strings.
 
+config AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT
+       string "Stop autobooting via crypt-hashed password"
+       depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED && AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION
+       help
+         This option adds the feature to only stop the autobooting,
+         and therefore boot into the U-Boot prompt, when the input
+         string / password matches a values that is hashed via
+         one of support crypt options and saved in the environment.
+
 config AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256
        string "Stop autobooting via SHA256 encrypted password"
        depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED && AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION
diff --git a/common/autoboot.c b/common/autoboot.c
index 0bb08e7a4c..732a01d0e5 100644
--- a/common/autoboot.c
+++ b/common/autoboot.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
 #include <bootcount.h>
+#include <crypt.h>
 
 DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
 
@@ -38,18 +39,62 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
 static int stored_bootdelay;
 static int menukey;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION
-#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256
-#else
-#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 ""
+#if defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION)
+#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPT_PW) && defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT)
+#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT
+#define HAS_STOP_STR_CRYPT 1
+#elif defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256)
+#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256
+#endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC)
+#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC ""
 #endif
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_USE_AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY
 #define AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY CONFIG_USE_AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY
 #else
 #define AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY 0
 #endif
 
+static int passwd_abort_crypt(uint64_t etime)
+{
+       const char *crypt_env_str = env_get("bootstopkeycrypt");
+       char presskey[MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR];
+       u_int presskey_len = 0;
+       int abort = 0;
+
+       if (IS_ENABLED(HAS_STOP_STR_CRYPT) && !crypt_env_str)
+               crypt_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC;
+
+       if (!crypt_env_str)
+               return 0;
+
+       /*
+        * We expect the stop-string to be newline terminated.
+        */
+       do {
+               if (tstc()) {
+                       /* Check for input string overflow */
+                       if (presskey_len >= MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR)
+                               return 0;
+
+                       presskey[presskey_len] = getchar();
+
+                       if ((presskey[presskey_len] == '\r') ||
+                           (presskey[presskey_len] == '\n')) {
+                               presskey[presskey_len] = '\0';
+                               crypt_compare(crypt_env_str, presskey, &abort);
+                               /* you had one chance */
+                               break;
+                       } else {
+                               presskey_len++;
+                       }
+               }
+       } while (get_ticks() <= etime);
+
+       return abort;
+}
+
 /*
  * Use a "constant-length" time compare function for this
  * hash compare:
@@ -89,7 +134,7 @@ static int passwd_abort_sha256(uint64_t etime)
        int ret;
 
        if (sha_env_str == NULL)
-               sha_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256;
+               sha_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC;
 
        presskey = malloc_cache_aligned(MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR);
        c = strstr(sha_env_str, ":");
@@ -245,10 +290,14 @@ static int abortboot_key_sequence(int bootdelay)
        printf(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_PROMPT, bootdelay);
 #  endif
 
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION))
-               abort = passwd_abort_sha256(etime);
-       else
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION)) {
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPT_PW))
+                       abort = passwd_abort_crypt(etime);
+               else
+                       abort = passwd_abort_sha256(etime);
+       } else {
                abort = passwd_abort_key(etime);
+       }
        if (!abort)
                debug_bootkeys("key timeout\n");
 
-- 
2.30.1

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