In the secure OS_BOOT spl execution code path, CMD_BOOTZ enables loading
of a zImage which might allow an attacker to bypass the authenticated
boot with fitImage by replacing it with a malicious image with header
identical to zImage.

Disabling CMD_BOOTZ ensures this code path is never hit inside
spl_parse_image_header.

Signed-off-by: Anshul Dalal <ansh...@ti.com>
---
 cmd/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/cmd/Kconfig b/cmd/Kconfig
index f21d27cb27f..4c23f04c699 100644
--- a/cmd/Kconfig
+++ b/cmd/Kconfig
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ config BOOTM_ELF
 
 config CMD_BOOTZ
        bool "bootz"
+       depends on !TI_SECURE_DEVICE
        help
          Boot the Linux zImage
 
-- 
2.49.0

Reply via email to