In the secure OS_BOOT spl execution code path, CMD_BOOTZ enables loading of a zImage which might allow an attacker to bypass the authenticated boot with fitImage by replacing it with a malicious image with header identical to zImage.
Disabling CMD_BOOTZ ensures this code path is never hit inside spl_parse_image_header. Signed-off-by: Anshul Dalal <ansh...@ti.com> --- cmd/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/cmd/Kconfig b/cmd/Kconfig index f21d27cb27f..4c23f04c699 100644 --- a/cmd/Kconfig +++ b/cmd/Kconfig @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ config BOOTM_ELF config CMD_BOOTZ bool "bootz" + depends on !TI_SECURE_DEVICE help Boot the Linux zImage -- 2.49.0