On Fri, Sep 18, 2026 at 07:42:56PM +0100, Ayoub Zaki wrote:
>
>
> On 9/18/26 18:53, Tom Rini wrote:
> > This is interesting and something that does have to be on our radar. My
> > first question is, should we not just update to a newer mbedtls release
> > and enable their SHA3-{256,384,512} supports, and anything else we need?
> > Then we tell people that need this that they need to move from legacy
> > crypto support to mbedtls (where we get to leverage a wider community
> > for security audit and response and so on). Thanks!
>
> Hi Tom,
> Thanks. I agree with the long-term maintenance benefits. ML-DSA
> requires SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 rather than just fixed-output SHA3.
> The TF-PSA-Crypto ML-DSA integration is marked experimental in the
> Mbed TLS 4.2 documentation.
> For this series I would prefer to retain the Linux kernel-based
> implementation with limited U-Boot adaptations. A migration to
> Mbed TLS could follow as its ML-DSA support matures.
> Would that be acceptable?Well, a problem I see is that this is something that needs active maintenance to stay in sync as we don't want to miss important fixes here. In theory, we get that with mbedtls (even if we're behind atm...). -- Tom
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