I'd like to disagree with Max (and perhaps Ron), a little.
The problems of the foundation of induction and deduction *are*
different. Since deduction is analytic, there is no way to falsify
it. The conclusions of deduction simply fall out of the rules of the
game you are playing. The problem of deduction is the problem of
mathematics --- there is no problem seeing why it works, the problem
is understanding why it is *useful*. Why do the conclusions of
deductive arguments (including the truths of mathematics) help us
understand the world?
That is a fundamentally different problem from the problem of
induction. Induction, since it is an inference that adds information,
is not a kind of inference that works independent of the world, the
way deduction does. Inductive conclusions *are* falsifiable;
induction can be wrong. Deduction can be faulty, but it can't be
wrong.
For example, Euclidean geometry is not wrong. There are just certain
times when, in order to usefully reason about the world, one should
abandon Euclidean geomety and use an alternative geometric scheme
based on a different set of axioms.
One minor note about Hume --- I think an important difference between
Hume and modern deconstructionists or other flavors of nihilist, is
that Hume *accepts* induction; he's simply mystified by why it works
and would like to put it on a firm foundation. He is not a skeptic
about its practicality. And I doubt that Ron is, either!
Robert
