Ronald J. Allen wrote:
> I am a law professor interested in various aspects of probability (by which
> I mean to include both fuzzy set theory, the standard probability calculus,
> and just about everything else related, actually) as they may apply to
> legal decision making. I have lurked on this list for some time, and
> learned much (for which I am grateful), but now I have a question (if I
> may). Before asking it, I should also say that I have no normative
> commitments to any of the positions represented in the various debates that
> occur on the list. For me, the various approaches to probability represent
> tools to be employed when helpful and appropriate to the task at hand,
> which brings me to my question. I have the sense that there is a double
> standard at play. If conventional probability theory (in particular, as I
> follow the discussions, expected utility/decision theory) does not explain,
> in essence, everything, it is accused of, in essence, explaining very
> little or nothing,
The imbalance you observe in the dialectical obligations in this debate
is to be expected. The key reason is the over-reaching (some would say
"outrageous") extent of the claims made by many of the proponents of
classical probability theory and decision theory. Thus we read in
Dennis Lindley's book <Making Decisions> (Wiley, 1985, 2nd Ed, page vii):
"The main conclusion [of this book] is that there is essentially only
one way to reach a decision sensibly."
If one presents something one claims to be a theory of everything,
even a single exception invalidates this claim.
-- Peter
