As usual, Professor Tillers is raising thought-provoking questions. Can 
his questions be addressed through the use of standard probability 
theory, as suggested by Jason Palmer? A view which is articulated in the 
following is that Professor Tillers' questions relate, in the main, to 
partiality of truth rather than to partiality of certainty. More 
specifically, the questions: "Are roller skates motor vehicles?" or, 
more contentiously, "Are motorized wheelchairs motor vehicles?" are in 
effect, questions which relate to the degrees to which roller skates and 
motorized wheelchairs are members of the fuzzy set of motor vehicles. 
Equivalently, grades of membership may be interpreted as truth values of 
the propositions, "Roller skates are motor vehicles," and "Motorized 
wheelchairs are motor vehicles." Generally, grades of membership and 
truth values are context-dependent. This is consistent with the points 
made in the exchange of messages between Professor Tillers and Jason 
Palmer. Note that measures of similarity may be interpreted as grades of 
membership or, equivalently, as truth values.

In a statement quoted by Professor Tillers, David Larkin points out that 
Bayesian network theory, call it BNT, can deal with continuous 
variables, and argues that this capability entails the capability of BNT 
to deal with partiality of truth. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
In fact, the incapability of BNT and, more generally, standard 
probability theory, call it PT, to deal with partiality of truth is a 
serious limitation of both BNT and PT. A consequence of this limitation 
is that BNT and PT do not have the capability to operate on 
perception-based information expressed in a natural language. The 
following relatively simple test problems are intended to lend support 
to this contention.

1.      The balls-in-box problem. A box contains black and white balls. 
My perceptions are: (a) there are about twenty balls; (b) most are 
black; and (c) there are several times as many black balls as white 
balls. What is the probability that a ball drawn at random is white?

2.      The Robert example. Usually Robert leaves his office at about 
5:30pm. Usually it takes him about thirty minutes to get home. What is 
the probability that Robert is home at about 6:15pm?

3.      The tall Swedes problem. My perception is that most Swedes are 
tall. What is the average height of Swedes?

4.      X is a real-valued random variable. Usually X is not very large. 
Usually X is not very small. What is the probability that X is neither 
small nor large? What is the expected value of X?

5.      X is a real-valued random variable. My perception of the 
probability distribution of X may be described as: Prob(X is small) is 
low; Prob(X is medium) is high; Prob(X is large) is low. What is the 
expected value of X?

 

What are the tools that are needed to solve such problems? What is 
needed is a generalization of PT--a generalization which adds to PT the 
capability to operate on perception-based information expressed in a 
natural language. Such generalization, call it PTp, was described in my 
paper, "Toward a Perception-Based Theory of Probabilistic Reasoning with 
Imprecise Probabilities," Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 
Vol. 105, 233-264, 2002. (Downloadable 
http://www-bisc.cs.berkeley.edu/BISCProgram/Projects.htm).

            For illustration, a very brief sketch of PTp-based solutions 
of Problems 1 and 3 is presented in this following.

Problem 1. Let X, Y and P denote, respectively, the number of black 
balls, the number of white balls and the probability that a ball drawn 
at random is white. Let a* denote "approximately a," with "approximately 
a" defined as a fuzzy set centering on a. Translating perception-based 
information into the Generalized Constraint Language (GCL), we arrive at 
the following equation:

                        (X+Y) is 20*

                        X is most�20*

                        X is several�Y

                        P is Y/20*.

In these equations, most and several are fuzzy numbers which are 
subjectively defined through their membership functions. X, Y and P are 
fuzzy numbers which are solutions of the equations. X, Y and P can 
readily be computed through the use of fuzzy integer programming.

            Problem 3. Assume that height of Swedes ranges from hmin to 
hmax. Let g(u) denote the count density function, meaning that g(u)du is 
the proportion of Swedes whose height lies in the interval u and u+du. 
The proposition "Most Swedes are tall" translates into "The integral 
over the interval [hmin , hmax] of g(u) times the membership function of 
tall, t(u), is most," where most is a fuzzy number which is subjectively 
defined through its membership function.

            The average height, have, is the integral over the interval 
[hmin, hmax] of g(u) times u. If g were known, this would be the average 
height of tall Swedes. In our problem, g is not known, but what we know 
is that it is constrained by the translation of the proposition "Most 
Swedes are tall." Through constraint propagation, the constraint on g 
induces a constraint on the average height. The rule governing 
constraint propagation is the extension principle of fuzzy logic. 
Applying this principle to the problem in question, leads to the 
membership function of the fuzzy set which describes the average height 
of Swedes. Details relating to use of the extension principle may be 
found in my JSPI paper.

            To understand why reasoning with perception-based 
information described in a natural language is beyond the reach of PT 
and BNT, it is helpful to introduce the concept of dimensionality of 
natural languages. Basically, a natural language is a system for 
describing perceptions. Among the many perceptions which underlie human 
cognition, there are three that stand not in importance: perception of 
truth (verity); perception of certainty (probability); and perception of 
possibility. These perceptions are distinct and each is associated with 
a degree which may be interpreted as a coordinate along a dimension. 
Thus, we can speak of the dimension of truth (verity), dimension of 
certainty (probability) and dimension of possibility.

            Natural languages are three-dimensional in the sense that, 
in general, a proposition, in a natural language is partially true, or 
partially certain, or partially possible, or some combination of the 
three. For example, "It is very likely that Robert is tall," is 
associated with partial certainty and partial possibility, while "It is 
quite true that Mary is rich," is associated with partial truth and 
partial possibility. Standard probability theory, PT, is one-dimensional 
in that it deals only with partiality of certainty and not with 
partiality of truth nor with partiality of possibility. The mismatch in 
dimensionalities is the reason why PT and BNT are ill-equipped for 
dealing with perception-based information expressed in a natural 
language. Note that, unlike PT, PTp is three-dimensional.

In retrospect, historians of science may find it difficult to understand 
why what is so obvious--that partiality of certainty and partiality of 
truth are distinct concepts and require different modes of 
treatment--encountered so much denial and resistance.

            Partiality of truth and partiality of certainty play pivotal 
roles in human cognition. But, in the realm of law, partiality of truth, 
and partiality of class membership, are much more pervasive than 
partiality of certainty. In many instances, they occur in combination.

                            Warm regards to all,

                                  Lotfi

Lotfi A. Zadeh
Computer Science Division
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1776
Tel(office): (510) 642-4959 Fax(office): (510) 642-1712

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