Dear colleague,The workshop on Logics and Collective Decision making LCD'07
will take place on March 13-14 in Lille, France. The invited speakers are:
Ken Binmore (DE, University College London)Franz Dietrich (University of
Maastricht and LSE)Wiebe van der Hoek (DCS, University of Liverpool)Gabriella
Pigozzi (CSC, University of Luxembourg)
Please find the list of accepted papers at the bottom of the mail.Please find
details at one the following
address:http://www.lcd07.orghttp://www.cril.univ-artois.fr/~konieczny/LCD07/We
would like to stress the fact the number of place is limited and that you can
enjoy a special price (including lunches and conference dinner) if you register
before March 2. Please register as soon as possible at the following address:
http://www.cril.univ-artois.fr/~konieczny/LCD07/registration.html.Please find
also the a list of hotels in Lille attached.
Please do forward this information.We hope to see you in Lille in
March!Best,LCD 07 OC
LCD'07 : Workshop on Logics and Collective Decision making
Invited Talks
Ken Binmore Making Decisions in Large Worlds
Foundations of Statistics"says that it would be preposterous to use Bayesian
decision theory outside what he calls a small world. This paper endorses this
judgement and proposes a minimal extension with an application to game theory.
Franz Dietrich Judgment aggregation: giving up propositionwise aggregation
Judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically
interconnected propositions. According to a (contestable) democratic intuition,
the collective judgment on any proposition (issue) should be determined by the
individuals' judgments on this proposition; that is, the group should take an
independent vote on each proposition. But propositionwise independence is known
to often create collective inconsistencies, as many impossibility results show.
I propose to give up propositionwise independence in favour of a new condition:
independence of irrelevant information, which requires that the collective
judgment on any proposition p is determined by the individuals' judgments on
all propositions relevant to p, possibly including propositions other than p
itself. Relevance can have many interpretations. The nature and strength of the
relevance-based independence condition depend on the notion of relevance used.
The more permissive this notion is, the more possibilities of aggregation
arise. I will discuss several notions of relevance, and show how relevance
should (not) be specified in order to obtain possibilities of aggregation.
Gabriella Pigozzi Belief revision, belief merging and social choice
Belief revision, belief merging and social choice theory share a number of
principles. Belief revision investigates the dynamics of the process of belief
change: when an agent is faced with new information which contradicts his/her
current beliefs, he/she will have to retract some of the old beliefs in order
to accommodate the new information consistently.Recently, the problem of belief
revision has been generalised to consider the aggregation of potentially
conflicting individual belief bases into a collective one. This new area is
called belief merging.On the other hand, social choice studies how to aggregate
individual preferences into a collectively preferred outcome. Although there
are clear connections between these areas, the investigation of the relations
between them is quite new. One way of analysing the interaction between belief
revision, belief merging and social choice is to express the voting principles
in a logical framework and then consider what belief revision and belief
merging would do in specific voting scenarios.
Wiebe van der Hoek On the Logic of Cooperation and Coalitions (Joint work with
Thomas Agotnes and Michael Wooldridge)
We discuss logics for cooperation in which in which agents have control over
certain aspects of the world. Moreover, this control can be delegated to other
agents. We then discuss Coalition Logic: we show how adding preferences to
Pauly's coalition logic CL enables one to express several game theoretical
concepts, and we finally show how adding for a restricted form of quantication
gives a language that is equally expressive, but exponentially more succingt
than CL.
Talks
Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first ?Nicolas Houy,
Lucie Menager
Incentives for informative voting Jean Francois Laslier, Jorgen W. Weibull
Maximum-based merging of incommensurable ranked belief bases Salem Benferhat,
Sylvain Lagrue, Julien Rossit
The (im)possibility of aggregating judgments on dependent variables Carl
Andreas Claussen, Oistein Roisland
Modal logics of negotiation and preference Ulle Endriss, Eric Pacuit
Efficient coalitions in boolean games Elise Bonzon, Marie-Christine
Lagasquie-Schiex, Jerome Lang
Information merging with trust Jonathan Ben-Naim, Emil Weydert
The impossibility of proximity preservation in belief merging Daniel Eckert
Modal dependence logic Jouko Vaananen
Infinite Majorities Eric Pacuit
Subjective information in decision making and communication Jack Stecher
On the link between arguments and criteria Wassila Ouerdane, Nicolas Maudet,
Alexis Tsoukias
Modeling player preferences with weighted formulas Joe Uckelman, Ulle Endriss
Model checking problem for knowledge and branching time N.V. Shirov, N.O.
Garanina
_________________________________________________________________
Essayez Live.com et créez l'Internet qui vous ressemble : infos, sports, météo
et bien plus encore !
http://www.live.com/getstarted
_______________________________________________
uai mailing list
[email protected]
https://secure.engr.oregonstate.edu/mailman/listinfo/uai
