** New Book ** ** New Book ** ** New Book ** ** New Book **
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS of COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY by Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, and Michael Wooldridge Published 2011 by Morgan & Claypool Publishers. http://dx.doi.org/10.2200/S00355ED1V01Y201107AIM016 ** OVERVIEW ** Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions. The book's web site, below, contains additional material including: - complete downloadable lecture slides to accompany the book; - video lectures of the book by the authors; - downloadable bibliography (BibTeX) for the book. Book web site: http://web.spms.ntu.edu.sg/~eelkind/coopbook/ "This manuscript was a pleasure to discover, and a pleasure to read -- a broad, but succinct, overview of work in computational cooperative game theory. I will certainly use this text with my own students, both within courses and to provide comprehensive background for students in my research group. The authors have made a substantial contribution to the multiagent systems and algorithmic game theory communities." -- Professor Jeffrey S. Rosenschein The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel "With the advent of the internet, the computational aspects of cooperative game theory are ever more relevant. This unique and timely book by Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge gives a concise and comprehensive survey of the subject, and serves at the same time as a one-stop introduction to cooperative game theory." -- Professor Bernhard von Stengel London School of Economics, UK "In recent years, research on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory has made tremendous progress, but previous textbooks have not included more than a short introduction to this important topic. I am excited by the thorough treatment in this new book, whose authors have been and continue to be at the very forefront of this research. Newcomers to the area are well advised to read this book carefully and cover to cover." -- Professor Vincent Conitzer Duke University, USA "Cooperative game theory has proved to be a fertile source of challenges and inspiration for computer scientists. This book will be an essential companion for everyone wanting to explore the computational aspects of cooperative game theory." -- Professor Makoto Yokoo Kyushu University, Japan "An excellent treatise on algorithms and complexity for cooperative games. It navigates through the maze of cooperative solution concepts to the very frontiers of algorithmic game theory research.The last chapter in particular will be enormously valuable for graduate students and young researchers looking for research topics." -- Professor Xiaotie Deng University of Liverpool, UK ** PUBLICATION DETAILS ** "Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory" by Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, and Michael Wooldridge. Published October 2011 by Morgan & Claypool Publishers. http://dx.doi.org/10.2200/S00355ED1V01Y201107AIM016 ** TABLE OF CONTENTS ** Preface Acknowledgments Summary of Key Notation 1. Introduction 1.1 Why are Non-Cooperative Games Non-Cooperative? 1.2 Computational Problems in Game Theory 1.3 The Remainder of This Book 1.4 Further Reading 2. BasicConcepts 2.1 Characteristic Function Games 2.2 Solution Concepts 2.2.1 Shapley Value 2.2.2 Banzhaf Index 2.2.3 Core and Core-Related Concepts 2.2.4 Nucleolus 2.2.5 Kernel 2.2.6 Bargaining Set 2.2.7 Stable Set 3. Representations and Algorithms 3.1 Combinatorial Optimization Games 3.1.1 Induced Subgraph Games 3.1.2 Network Flow Games 3.1.3 Assignment and Matching Games 3.1.4 Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games 3.1.5 Facility Location Games 3.2 Complete Representations 3.2.1 Marginal Contribution Nets 3.2.2 Synergy Coalition Groups 3.2.3 Skill-Based Representations 3.2.4 Algebraic Decision Diagrams 3.3 Oracle Representation 4. Weighted Voting Games 4.1 Definition and Examples 4.2 Dummies and Veto Players 4.2.1 Power and Weight 4.2.2 Computing the Power Indices 4.2.3 Paradoxes of Power 4.3 Stability in Weighted Voting Games 4.3.1 The Least Core, the Cost of Stability, and the Nucleolus 4.4 Vector Weighted Voting Games 4.4.1 Computing the Dimension of a Simple Game 5 Beyond Characteristic Function Games 5.1 Non-transferable Utility Games 5.1.1 Formal Model 5.1.2 Hedonic Games 5.1.3 Qualitative Games 5.2 Partition Function Games 6. Coalition Structure Formation 6.1 Coalition Structure Generation 6.1.1 Dynamic Programming 6.1.2 Anytime Algorithms 6.2 Coalition Formation by Selfish Rational Agents 6.2.1 Coalition Formation Via Bargaining 6.2.2 Dynamic Coalition Formation 6.2.3 Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty 6.3 Coalition Formation and Learning 7 Advanced Topics 7.1 Links between Cooperative and Non-cooperativeGames 7.1.1 Cooperation in Normal-Form Games 7.1.2 Non-Cooperative Justifications of Cooperative Solution Concepts 7.1.3 Program Equilibrium 7.2 Using Mechanism Design for Coalition Formation 7.2.1 Anonymity-Proof Solution Concepts 7.3 Overlapping and Fuzzy Coalition Formation 7.4 Logical Approaches to Cooperative Game Theory 7.5 Applications 7.5.1 Coalitions in Communication Networks 7.5.2 Coalitions in the Electricity Grid 7.5.3 Core-Selecting Auctions 7.6 Research Directions Bibliography Authors' Biographies Index Georgios Chalkiadakis Assistant Professor Electronic and Computer Engineering Technical University of Crete http://www.intelligence.tuc.gr/~gehalk/
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