I am not sure I follow the reasoning (and yes, I read the forum thread). I do not see this as a critical issue.
1. this is not limited to changing ~/.bashrc. There are many other avenues for infiltration via a trojan if the user installs untrusted applications. 2. why would making .bashrc read-only solve the issue? If I am running my trojan under the user's id, I can simply make it writable again & then write what I want in there. 3. This depends on having either (a) access to a logged-in account, or (b) install/build of untrusted code/applications. On (a), if an user left the system unlocked, then there is absolutely nothing Ubuntu -- or any other OS -- can do. There is a limit on how far we can protect against user laxness. On (b), If you are installing/building untrusted applications (from a strict security point-of-view) you have already compromised your system. I do not see this as either a Ubuntu security issue, or a problem with sudo, but I am leaving the final decision to the security folks here. -- getting the root password through .bashrc and a fakesudo https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/127116 You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is the bug contact for Ubuntu. -- ubuntu-bugs mailing list [email protected] https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs
