On Monday, 2. May 2016, 16:13:37 I wrote: > As far as I know ~anders-kaseorg should be right in Bug #1556666. The > keys are statically imported to the trusted-Keychain. The SHA-1 o > signature isn't used for any verification in any apt mechanisms I know. > For this reason the warning in the output of apt-get update should be > more than enough.
On Monday, 2. May 2016, 18:14:00 I wrote: > | W: [...] > | Signature by key 882F7199B20F94BD7E3E690EFADD8D64B1275EA3 uses > | weak digest algorithm (SHA1) On Monday, 2. May 2016, 18:14:00 I wrote: > IMHO for nothing! Hi all, another correction to the backgrounds of the SHA-1 stuff. Someting missleads me the SHA-1 signature on the key to be the security issue. It's the signature in the Release.gpg / InRelease file that causes the issue. For more details: http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkatz/papers/pgp-attack.pdf Exchanging the Key would be usefull to make old signatures worthless for future attacks. But the key itself is not / or at least should not be the cause of this message. ;-) That would mean that the lines in gpg.conf should probably fix that, if exchanging the key is not an option. If you're doing this, you must hope nobody can find old signatures of your key. An hash collision atack (the length attack is a special case of this) isn't an easy attack, but for distributing malware as security update via an compromised or malvious mirror server this isn't impossible someone does. For this it's reasonable to warn or disable this by default with an error message. Now, from background informations back to the bug... Of course this does'nt change the following... On Monday, 2. May 2016, 16:13:37 I wrote: > In our case netboot install failed with a "no suitable kernel found with > your apt settings" (message text written down from memory), when our > internal software repository was included to bootstrap our deployment > environment. [...] > IMHO this should at least be catched with a propper error message. On Monday, 2. May 2016, 18:14:00 I wrote: > Or people are simply > deploying the repository URL via preseed and get weired errors, now. > > At least the last case *should* be fixed, since this will burn a lot of > time. And I didn't mean my time, I know this Bug, now. ;-) :-D As mentioned in my previos messages, I tried to find the lines causing this but without success, or at least without being able to reproduce this with the eqations of the binarys in an usual xenial installation (the scripts would IMHO run with the udeb eqations of gpgv and apt-get - I asummed they're behaving equally but do they?). This is'nt really easy to trobleshoot because there are mutiple special packages for installation and bootstraping playing together. ;-) Kind regards, Lars -- man-da.de GmbH, AS8365 Phone: +49 6151 16-71027 Mornewegstraße 30 Fax: +49 6151 16-71198 D-64293 Darmstadt e-mail: [email protected] Geschäftsführer Marcus Stögbauer AG Darmstadt, HRB 94 84 -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1553121 Title: Xenial preseed fails to load key for 3rd party repo with apt- setup/local0/key To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt-setup/+bug/1553121/+subscriptions -- ubuntu-bugs mailing list [email protected] https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs
