** Also affects: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided => High
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Tyler Hicks (tyhicks)
** Also affects: upstart (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** No longer affects: upstart (Ubuntu Xenial)
** Changed in: upstart (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in: upstart (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: upstart (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided => High
** Changed in: upstart (Ubuntu Trusty)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Tyler Hicks (tyhicks)
** Description changed:
+ =apparmor 16.04 SRU=
[Impact]
The kernel in xenial-proposed (4.4.0-46.67) and the lxd that has recently
migrated from xenial-proposed (2.0.5-0ubuntu1~ubuntu16.04.1) allows us to
enable stacked/namespaced AppArmor policy for lxd containers. This means that
the container can have an overall confinement profile while still allowing
individual processes inside of the container to have individual confinement
profiles. This bug is for the apparmor userspace changes needed to allow the
container init to load apparmor profiles during the container boot procedure.
[Test Case]
Install the kernel from xenial-proposed (4.4.0-46.67). Reboot into the new
kernel and set up a new xenial lxd container (MUST be an unprivileged
container):
$ lxc start ubuntu:16.04 x
Install apparmor from xenial-proposed (2.10.95-0ubuntu2.5) inside of the
container and reboot the container.
Verify that the container's dhclient is confined inside of an AppArmor
namespace with a stacked profile that was loaded inside of the
container:
$ ps auxZ | grep
'^lxd-x_</var/lib/lxd>//&:lxd-x_<var-lib-lxd>:///sbin/dhclient'
lxd-x_</var/lib/lxd>//&:lxd-x_<var-lib-lxd>:///sbin/dhclient (enforce) 165536
3889 0.0 0.0 16120 860 ? Ss 03:55 0:00 /sbin/dhclient -1 -v -pf
/run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases -I -df
/var/lib/dhcp/dhclient6.eth0.leases eth0
[Regression Potential]
The regression potential is relatively high because processes inside of
Ubuntu containers can be confined with an additional profile that is loaded
inside of the container. However, this feature was released in Ubuntu 16.10
with no known issues so far.
- [Original Description]
+ =Original Description=
Now that we have support for apparmor namespacing and stacking,
unprivileged containers can and should be allowed to load apparmor
profiles.
The following changes are needed at least:
- Change the systemd unit to remove the "!container" condition
- Change the apparmor init script, replacing the current simple container
check for something along the lines of:
- If /proc/self/attr/current says "unconfined"
- And /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/domain/stack contains "yes"
- And /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/domain/version is 1.2 or
higher
- Then continue execing the script, otherwise exit 0
John suggested he could add a file which would provide a more reliable
way to do this check ^
In either case, we need this change so that containers can behave more
like normal systems as far as apparmor is concerned. That change should
also be SRUed back to Xenial at the same time the kernel support for
stacking is pushed.
This bug is effectively a blocker for snapd inside LXD as without this,
snap-confine and snapd itself will not be confined after container
restart.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1628285
Title:
apparmor should be allowed to start in containers
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