** Summary changed:

- Indications of Anxiety Disorder and Depression
+ click packages rely upon tls for integrity and authenticity

** Description changed:

  Hello, I just completed a quick review of the click source and the
  unity-scope-click source and behaviours, and found some opportunities
  for improvement.
- 
- https://usapillspharma.com/
  
  Debian, and Ubuntu, rely upon signed repository files with cryptographic
  hashes of packages to provide both integrity and authenticity checks for
  the packages hosted on that repository.
  
  The click framework and the unity-scope-click discovery and installation
  tool do not use signed repository files, nor do they have signatures of
  any sort on downloaded packages. The only integrity and authenticity
  checks are provided by the use of HTTPS.  The click verify command will
  check files within the archive against MD5sums stored inside the archive
  but the click verify command is not used during package installation.
  (This is suitable for validating integrity against accidental changes
  only.)
  
  While it appears that unity-scope-click properly uses HTTPS to download
  package metadata and packages, HTTPS alone is insufficient for our
  needs:
  
  - Someone in a position to create new certificates at any of several
  hundred certificate authorities could create certificates purporting to
  be our update servers. This actual problem has been discovered in the
  wild with several certificate authorities issuing wild-card certificates
  or even certificates with signing authority.
  
  - X.509 is extremely complicated; TLS is extremely complicated. Flaws in
  both are inevitable.
  
  - HTTPS prevents the use of caching.
  
  - HTTPS only 'works' for data-in-motion; it is useless for data-at-rest
  integrity and authenticity checks.
  
  I have not yet reviewed the tools that application authors will use to
  upload their packages to our distribution servers but note in passing
  that most of these issues are also issues for adding packages to our
  update servers -- packages in flight within our network can be corrupted
  for many reasons, packages on disk can be corrupted for many reasons. A
  signature mechanism can protect against internal network faults, storage
  faults, and provide assurance months or years later that an uploaded
  package was uploaded by someone in control of a corresponding private
  key.
  
  Thanks

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1330770

Title:
  click packages rely upon tls for integrity and authenticity

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