Public bug reported:

[Impact]

 * 18.04 LTS release with a long support time frame
 * There are two versions of OpenSSL shipped in 18.04:
   - obsolete 1.0.2
   - current long term supported 1.1.1 series
 * OpenSSH in 18.04 is the only package in main using libcrypto from 1.0.2
 * The fact that OpenSSH uses a different libcrypto implementation impacts 
certification, 
   compliance, and security maintenance.
 * Furthermore OpenSSH does not benefit from hardware accelerated crypto, as 
available in 1.1.1
 * Thus there is a desire to upgrade OpenSSH in 18.04 from 1:7.6p1-4 to 
1:7.9p1-10 and compile 
   against OpenSSL 1.1.1
 * 1:7.9p1-10 is currently shipped in Disco/Eoan, and it is likely that 20.04 
will ship with 
   1:8.0p1 or newer. Thus security maintainance burden is slightly increased. 
However, 1:7.9p1-10
   is likely to be shipped in the next stable Debian release, and supported 
there for a long-ish
   time including debian-lts efforts. Thus there are some synergies.

[Upstream Changelogs]

 * https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.9
 * https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.8
 * https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.7

[Test Case]

 * Install openssh-server and openssh-client, check that they depend on 
libssl1.1 and do not depend 
   on libssl1.0
 
 * Check that there are no new connectivity issues between old/new servers and 
clients,
   at the very least between various Ubuntu releases in the public clouds.

[Regression Potential]

v7.9

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms
   option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate
   authorities.

DSA keys as certificate authorities are widely banned already. May
affect connectivity.

 * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has
   changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate
   fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key
   fingerprint).

This may impact log parsers, i.e. logwatch and similar. Possibly worth a
NEWS entry.

v7.8

 * ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default
   instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format. The OpenSSH format,
   supported in OpenSSH releases since 2014 and described in the
   PROTOCOL.key file in the source distribution, offers substantially
   better protection against offline password guessing and supports
   key comments in private keys. If necessary, it is possible to write
   old PEM-style keys by adding "-m PEM" to ssh-keygen's arguments
   when generating or updating a key.

Normally, it shouldn't matter which format newly generated keys use.
Existing keys remain unchanged. Systems that automatically
generate/parse/store keys may be impacted. The risk here is low. As
potential mitigation we can revert the default back to PEM for the SRU
into bionic.

 * sshd(8): remove internal support for S/Key multiple factor
   authentication. S/Key may still be used via PAM or BSD auth.

S/Key is not widely deployed. Most common OTP implementations use PAM
stack, and use HOTP, TOTP, Yubikey and similar one time passwords,
rather than S/Key. This is deemed low.

 * ssh(1): remove vestigal support for running ssh(1) as setuid. This
   used to be required for hostbased authentication and the (long
   gone) rhosts-style authentication, but has not been necessary for
   a long time. Attempting to execute ssh as a setuid binary, or with
   uid != effective uid will now yield a fatal error at runtime.

This is security and hardening improvement. We do not ship sshd setuid.

 * sshd(8): the semantics of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and the similar
   HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options have changed. These now specify
   signature algorithms that are accepted for their respective
   authentication mechanism, where previously they specified accepted
   key types. This distinction matters when using the RSA/SHA2
   signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512" and their
   certificate counterparts. Configurations that override these
   options but omit these algorithm names may cause unexpected
   authentication failures (no action is required for configurations
   that accept the default for these options).

This is potentially a problem. We can add upgrade hooks to warn users
about these, or abort the upgrade. This will require user configuration
changes, if they set these settings (which might be done by config
management systems). These are not widely used options. May affect
connectivity.

 * sshd(8): the precedence of session environment variables has
   changed. ~/.ssh/environment and environment="..." options in
   authorized_keys files can no longer override SSH_* variables set
   implicitly by sshd.

This is security and hardening improvement. Thus desirable to ship.
Should not affect connectivity.

 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): the default IPQoS used by ssh/sshd has changed.
   They will now use DSCP AF21 for interactive traffic and CS1 for
   bulk.  For a detailed rationale, please see the commit message:
   https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c#rev1.284

This change has been reverted in the -10 distribution packaging.

v7.7

 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Drop compatibility support for some very old SSH
   implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*. These
   versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the final
   SSH RFCs. The support in question isn't necessary for RFC-compliant
   SSH implementations.

This is security and hardening improvement. Deemed low to affect anyone.

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: Fix Released

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu Bionic)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: Confirmed

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu Cosmic)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: Confirmed

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu Disco)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: Fix Released

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu Eoan)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: Fix Released

** Also affects: openssh (Ubuntu Bionic)
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

** Also affects: openssh (Ubuntu Cosmic)
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

** Also affects: openssh (Ubuntu Eoan)
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

** Also affects: openssh (Ubuntu Disco)
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

** Changed in: openssh (Ubuntu Eoan)
       Status: New => Fix Released

** Changed in: openssh (Ubuntu Disco)
       Status: New => Fix Released

** Changed in: openssh (Ubuntu Cosmic)
       Status: New => Confirmed

** Changed in: openssh (Ubuntu Bionic)
       Status: New => Confirmed

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1832356

Title:
  Upgrade OpenSSH to 7.9p1-10 or better in stable series

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