Review for Source Package: sudo-common
[Summary]
sudo-common is a configuration-only native package (Architecture: all)
that extracts /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/README, /etc/pam.d/sudo,
and /etc/pam.d/sudo-i from the existing sudo source package into a
shared dependency. This enables both sudo and sudo-rs to share
identical default configuration without depending on each other,
supporting Ubuntu's sudo-rs transition plan. The package only contains
configuration files and no executable code.
MIR team ACK
This does need a security review, so I'll assign ubuntu-security - This is a
very small package but a double-check of the configuration files is recommended.
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: sudo-common
Notes:
Recommended TODOs:
- The package should get a team bug subscriber before being promoted -
Foundations team was recommended by the original submission
[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
- There is no other package in main providing the same functionality.
The sudo source package previously shipped these configuration files,
but sudo-common extracts them into a shared dependency so both sudo
and sudo-rs can use them without one depending on the other. The
Breaks/Replaces against sudo (<< 1.9.17p2-1ubuntu2~) ensures a
clean file ownership transition.
A team is committed to own long term maintenance of this package - Foundations
The rationale given in the report seems valid and useful for Ubuntu.
[Dependencies]
- no other runtime Dependencies to MIR due to this
-no other build-time Dependencies with active code in the final binaries
to MIR due to this
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
more tests now.
Problems: None
[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
OK:
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- No vendoring used, all Built-Using are in main
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- Does not include vendored code
Problems: None
[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
an untrusted source.
- does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
==> This package does ship PAM configuration files sudo and sudo-i. A look at
these files by the security team is recommended.
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
signing, ...)
- this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
apparmor, ...) - This package has sensible security defaults that minimize
the risk of the package.
Problems:
- The package touches security-sensitive configurations, PAM and sudoers, but
introduces no new content. These are the same well-established defaults
extracted from the existing sudo package but a security review of these
configurations is recommended.
[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- this package does not have a test suite that runs at build time but this is
justified in the original MIR submission. There is no executable code in this
package, only configuration files.
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
- This does not need special HW for build or test
- no new python2 dependency
Problems: None
[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
- debian/watch is not present but also not needed (e.g. native)
- Upstream update history is N/A - native package
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is good - very new package
- the current release is packaged
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
maintained the package
- no massive Lintian warnings
- debian/rules is rather clean
- It is not on the lto-disabled list
Problems: None
[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf - N/A
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
tests)
- no use of user 'nobody' outside of tests
- no use of setuid / setgid
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit or libseed
- not part of the UI for extra checks
- no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)?
Problems: None
** Changed in: sudo-common (Ubuntu)
Assignee: Myles Penner (mylesjp) => (unassigned)
** Changed in: sudo-common (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Ubuntu Security Team (ubuntu-security)
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2139408
Title:
[MIR] sudo-common
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