Hi Alessandro, thank you for the quick response and the explanation. I agree with the security concerns you have raised here. But I also feel sad about taking away the ability of users to use a custom .desktop file (which is an explicit and intentional act that the snapped application cannot do on its own). The GNOME desktop (upstream and in Ubuntu) already trusts and allows users to drop in custom .desktop files in ~/.local/share/applications for just their own account.
As the question here is "Should the sandbox security model allow the user (not the app) to override the .desktop file association?", if this is an intentional decision, I will live with the limitation here. -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2146522 Title: Custom .desktop files with StartupWMClass cannot override icon for snap applications To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gnome-shell/+bug/2146522/+subscriptions -- ubuntu-bugs mailing list [email protected] https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs
