Thank you Seth! I think that resolves the implications from the security perspective. We'll consider runtime root code execution via any cloud agent at any time acceptable in principle then. Of course if the agent doesn't authenticate its host adequately then that would be treated as a (probably security) bug, but that's not what's in question here.
I think we still need to make a policy decision on the plugin packaging question. This reminds me of cases where software is designed to update itself. In packaging we turn these off as part of packaging, since otherwise this bypasses packaging. Some options are: 0) Disable plugins by default. 1) Package plugins, and limit plugins the agent will execute to only the packaged ones (by default). 2) Review external plugins as part of reviewing the packaging, and embed and enforce an allowlist (by default) of reviewed hashes. Then the packaging wouldn't contain the source of these plugins, but would still be locked to what was reviewed. I favour the former because the latter would break the property that all source (that isn't from the restricted or multiverse components that may omit source) is available to the user through the usual channels. "Default" means that the user could override by changing configuration in /etc for example. It is undecided whether they should be able to do so via userdata or similar means. -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2164943 Title: [SRU][FFE] Please update to version 20260819.00 To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/google-guest-agent/+bug/2164943/+subscriptions -- ubuntu-bugs mailing list [email protected] https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs
