Malu questioned MPRI�s plan to slash the size of the Nigerian military from 100,000 to 50,000 and its need to have access to sensitive military information. �How much intelligence about your country do you give to a foreign country?� Malu said he asked. He never got an answer and remains convinced that the goal of the company was to gather intelligence for the U.S. government � a contention Soyster dismissed. �From a military point of view, they weren�t very effective,� Soyster said of the Nigerians.
Victor L. Malu (middle) with Sierra Leone deputy minister of defense Sam H. Norman (left) and ECOWAS executive secretary Lansana Kouyate (Reuters) The controversy surrounding its work in Nigeria notwithstanding, it was Equatorial Guinea that proved to be the greater challenge for MPRI. MPRI first applied for a license from the State Department, as required by U.S. law, to work in Equatorial Guinea in 1998. But the department�s Bureau of African Affairs rejected the request because of Equatorial Guinea�s history of human rights violations. MPRI appealed that decision to the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, then Susan Rice. �I pointed out to her that no one knows what�s going on in the country, and the U.S. ambassador has supported our application,� Soyster said. This time, the private military company cleared the Africa bureau�s concerns, only to hit another roadblock at the department�s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Again, MPRI lobbied, this time in the U.S. Congress, and a contract to assess Equatorial Guinea�s defense needs was approved. Between 2001 and 2002, MPRI made several trips to Malabo to meet with government officials and oil company executives. Bill Watson, vice president of Hess Triton in Equatorial Guinea, was one of those who met with MPRI, characterizing it as a �courtesy� visit. Also participating in some of the meetings was Staples, the U.S. ambassador to Cameroon, according to a military attach� who was present at the meetings. MPRI then submitted a proposal to revamp the armed and police forces of Equatorial Guinea, but was granted a license by the State Department in May 2002 to train only the Coast Guard. U.S. Sen. Russell Feingold, a leading proponent of human rights in Africa, has been at the forefront of opposition to MPRI getting a contract for comprehensive military training in Equatorial Guinea for fear that U.S.-trained forces will be used against government opponents. �Imagine the U.S. developing a Coast Guard without considering a Navy?� said Soyster. �You got to look at the whole thing. So we�re licensed to do the Coast Guard, but it�s entirely up to the president of Equatorial Guinea if he wants to continue with just the Coast Guard.� Soyster said he discussed Equatorial Guinea�s human rights record with Obiang on at least five occasions and was told by the president that his country needed U.S. assistance to deal with its problems and become more democratic. According to Soyster, Obiang said he wanted �a disciplined force that I can send to various places to take care of whatever the problem is.� Soyster said he warned the U.S. government of competition from other countries, adding that �the big flags over there are China and North Korea.� The French, Russians and Chinese are also active in companies that service the oil sector. An area of vital interest In April 2001, an MPRI representative met with the Pentagon�s regional director for Central Africa to discuss the company�s hopes of winning the contract to train Equatorial Guinea�s forces. �They may need our help or moral support,� Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski wrote in a memo on the meeting, obtained by ICIJ under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. She quoted the MPRI representative as saying that Equatorial Guinea was �the Kuwait of the Gulf of Guinea� and, in a briefing paper three months later, advanced that characterization to �a possible �Kuwait of Africa� with huge oil reserves� that was �US-friendly for both investment and security reasons.� Kwiatkowski also noted in her April memo that the highest-ranking U.S. official to meet with Obiang when he visited Washington early in 2001 was an assistant secretary of agriculture � that after French President Jacques Chirac had spared time to meet with him. Despite concerns about Equatorial Guinea�s human rights record, Obiang�s currency rose dramatically after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. When he visited the United States as it marked the first anniversary of the attacks, Obiang was among 10 African leaders to meet with President George Bush for talks on the prospect of war with Iraq and peace and development on the African continent. His visit was preceded by a report from the African Oil Policy Initiative Group � an ad-hoc coalition of Africa consultants, energy executives and staff from a U.S. congressional subcommittee on Africa. Titled �African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development,� the report recommended that Congress and the White House declare the Gulf of Guinea an �area of vital interest� to the United States � a designation never before extended to any region of Africa � giving it strategic and military priority. The Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group is led by Robert Heiler and Paul Michael Wihbey of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a conservative Jerusalem-based think tank which maintains that West African oil �can help stabilize the Middle East, end Muslim terror and secure a measure of energy security.� <<<< Prev Oil Diplomacy: Page 4 of 5 [ PDF Version] Next >>>>
