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Nine years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has reached another
crossroads. The transition period defined by the Arusha Accords will be
concluded in less than a year by a constitutional referendum and by multi-party
elections which should symbolize the successful democratisation of the country.
Today, however, there are multiple restrictions on political and civil liberty
and no sign of any guarantee, or even indication, in the outline of the
constitutional plan that the political opposition will be able to participate in
these elections on an equal footing with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), in
power since 1994.
Control over the activities of political parties was until now partly justified by the fragile security situation that Rwanda has experienced since 1994, during which it has been in a state of almost permanent war with the Hutu heirs of the Habyarimana regime on the DRC territory. The constant political and military support provided to the Rwandan Hutu militia by the successive Kabila regimes since 1998, has maintained a continuing security threat to the country. The restrictions on political participation can also be explained by the RPF's distrust of multi-party politics and unrestricted electoral competition, inspired directly by the experience of the country�s political disintegration in early 1990s leading into the genocide.
Faced with the risk of electoral competition based exclusively
on ethnic lines, the RPF wants first and foremost to restructure Rwandan
political culture through popular education and the increased accountability of
political leaders. The Rwandan leadership argues, in effect, that the
transformation of existing states of mind is the prerequisite for the
restoration of full civil and political rights. Thus, for the past three years,
the political parties have either been dismantled or forced to accept the
consensus imposed by the RPF, the independent press has been silenced, and civil
society forced to exist between repression and coercion. The RPF wields almost
exclusive military, political and economic control and tolerates no criticism or
challenge to its authority. The opposition has been forced into exile, and
anti-establishment speeches relegated to secrecy. In the name of unity and
national reconciliation, the various segments of Rwandan society are subjected
to a paternalistic and authoritarian doctrine and cannot express themselves
freely.
But the RPF should recognise that its authoritarian actions,
whatever their motivation, has worked against its own stated objectives and is
creating its own opposition. The government's repression of critical voices
creates a vicious circle by radicalizing the opposition both inside and outside
Rwanda. A blood pact, or "Igihango", has even been sealed between certain heirs
of the "Hutu power"; and survivors of the genocide. This kind of alliance lends
a dangerous legitimacy to an armed Hutu opposition whose position regarding the
genocide remains ambiguous. Given the unstable regional dynamics, the rise to
power by the opposition forces and the propagation of genocide denial pose a
serious threat to the stability of the country, particularly at a time when the
Rwandan government is preparing to liberate tens of thousands of prisoners
through gacaca courts and to repatriate and demobilise a large part of
its army and rebel combatants.
The Rwandan government has honoured its commitments to the
Congolese peace process and has withdrawn its troops from the Kivus. It should
now display the same goodwill for the end of the transition. The RPF must allow
public criticism and stop being judge and jury, as well as participant, in the
process of political competition. A neutral institution, such as an ombudsman�s
office � equipped with political, administrative, and financial independence �
must be allowed to establish equitable standards for political competition and
to define the limits of freedom of expression and association, in order to avoid
abuse bound to lead to ethnic tensions.
ICG does not argue that all surveillance and all restraint
should be removed from party, media and civil society activities. The external
security situation, and the fragility of the internal reconciliation process,
make continuing caution appropriate. But the regulation of political parties
should be seen to be above partisan manipulation, with standards imposed not by
the RPF but a wholly independent authority. The government must give Rwandan
society the chance to regulate itself, to assume its own responsibilities
towards the genocide and to create the foundations for general reconciliation,
and not seek to impose every element of that process. It must not destroy the
institutions of common ground where Hutus and Tutsis can meet, talk, argue and
ultimately agree on the future of the country. It must reach out to the
opposition in exile and offer it participation in a national debate on the
country's future.
The year to come will be a crucial one for the credibility of Rwandan constitutional reform, electoral deadlines and post-transition institutions. The international community cannot remain silent accomplices to the authoritarian actions of the Rwandan government. It cannot finance elections that offer no political guarantees for a minimum of equity among the forces present. Today, eight months before the end of the transition period, the Rwandan government must bring itself to accept political liberalisation and reform.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Rwanda:
1. Cease all harassment of civil society and revise the law on
associations to allow them to operate freely in the entire country without the
constant control of government agents;
2. Encourage the emergence of a responsible and independent
press by allowing it to regulate its activities in the framework of its
professional associations;
3. Liberalise political activities across the entire country;
and engage in a national debate on the rules of integration for all political
constituents in the country in preparation for the next
elections;
4. Allow the return and the participation of political parties
in exile in time for the next elections, on condition that they cut all links
with the armed groups, clearly and convincingly acknowledge and deplore the
genocide, and commit themselves to a reconciliation process;
5. Create an Ombudsman�s office, directed by a committee of
�wise men� representing different sections of Rwandan society and equipped with
political, administrative, and financial autonomy from any branch of government.
This office would have the responsibility of determining the rules of good
conduct for politicians, establishing clear distinctions between legitimate
criticism and genocide-denying or hatred-inciting behaviour. The ombudsman could
also be mandated to recommend appropriate measures to deal with similar concerns
arising in the press and civil society.
To the opposition in exile:
6. Make contact with the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and participate in the transfer of g�nocidaires within the
framework of the Pretoria agreement;
7. Stop immediately armed opposition and station, demobilise,
and repatriate all its troops;
8. Clarify its own political agenda for the future of Rwanda
and spell out the programs by which it would advance reconciliation;
9. Make clear its acknowledgment and deploring of the genocide
and its rejection of revisionist sentiment;
10. Participate in a national political conference in
To the international community and donors to Rwanda:
11. Demand the unconditional release of Pasteur Bizimungu,
Charles Ntakiruntika, Jean Mbanda, Pierre Gakwandi and all other Rwandan
political prisoners;
12. Support the establishment of an Ombudsman�s office and
grant it the means of financial independence;
13. Refuse to finance the 2003 elections and the establishment
of post-transitional institutions unless they are not preceded by the
liberalisation of political activities and a marked improvement in respect for
basic freedoms of association and expression;
14. Support immediately the creation of a program to monitor
the electoral campaign and the elections themselves.
15. Actively support the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and particularly the disarmament, demobilisation,
repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) program for the Hutu
rebels and commit to a serious surveillance of the security situation in Eastern
Congo to allow the government of Rwanda to pursue its reconciliation and
political program in a peaceful environment.
To the Government of South Africa:
16. Convince Rwanda to liberalise its internal political
environment and to adopt an open-door policy towards exiled political parties,
provided that they reject all links with the armed groups, contribute to the
arrest and prosecution of known genocidaires at the ICTR, condemn
genocide and clarify their stand regarding reconciliation in the
country.
17. Engage in cooperation with The United Nations Observer Mission to the Congo (MONUC) in a negotiation with other African countries on the resettlement of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) combatants who are ready to lay down their arms but refuse to be repatriated to Rwanda. The Mulindwas
communication group
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