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Sent: Friday, January 31, 2003 5:15 AM
Subject: [rwanda-l] Rwandan diplomacy in winds of change longer worked" President Paul Kagame quickly understood that Rwanda's so far successful diplomacy was crumbling when the new Congolese President Joseph Kabila became the rising sun of the region. The US Bush administration demonstrated it would not be as good an ally as Clinton had been, and the French were on the return. The Rwandan diplomacy needed to change, and it did. Rwanda finds itself in the peculiar position of being a small, African nation, but nonetheless having been in the focus of international intention for many years. The reasons are however obvious, Rwanda being the scene of humanity's most recent genocide, and Rwanda being one key player in the Congo Kinshasa conflict. The 1994 genocide, killing an estimated 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu brought shame on the international community. Instead of trying to prevent the genocide, the United Nations and other foreigners were quick to leave the country and leave the Hutu radicals to turn the country into the last killing fields of the 20th century. This extreme event will change Rwanda forever, but it has also changed Rwanda's position in international politics. Although the acting government cannot claim total innocence to the events leading up to the genocide, it is generally seen as the representative of the victims of the genocide. Paul Kagame therefore often is received with the same moral weight as Jewish Holocaust survivors, heirs of the victims of the 1915 Armenian genocide (by Ottoman Turks) and the Cambodian killing fields of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. UK and US allies This weight had given the Kagame government strong allies in the United States and the United Kingdom, accepting the slow progress of democratisation and Rwanda's need to insure its security, even at the cost of invading neighbouring Congo Kinshasa. The Congolese support for the ex Forces Arm�es Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe, armed groups that carried out the Rwandan genocide in 1994, was generally accepted as an understandable reason for Rwanda's actions. Ex-President Laurent Kabila undemocratic, unpredictable and rather hostile image further enhanced this. The UK/US support was strong enough for Rwanda to break away from the French zone of influence and the "Francophonie" (there is much evidence supporting French aid to the genocide perpetrators) - something unheard of in Paris. The French diplomacy has been hostile to Rwanda ever since Kagame and his mostly Anglophone cabinet came to power, but Paris has had little success gaining majority within the European Union (EU) or other international bodies for its anti- Rwandan policy. Rwandan diplomacy seemed firmly based on its widespread sympathy in the international community, again based on the understanding that Rwanda was a special case. It was accepted that democratisation was to be a slow process and that Rwanda had special security rights to prevent the return of the genocide perpetrators. The fruits of the seeds were many, but most significantly international aid for the reconstruction of the country and a deaf ear towards information that Rwandan troops or allies committed human rights violations in the Congo or that Rwanda facilitated the illegal trade in Angolan rebel diamonds. The Rwanda diplomacy however also showed signs of weakness, as the Kigali government alienated the great majority of African countries. Breaking out of the French folder automatically made most of francophone Africa turn against Rwanda (however, a French push towards this is not to be underestimated). Rwanda's and Uganda's invasion of Congo Kinshasa, an answer to late Laurent Kabila's support for the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, alienated most Southern Africa, finally pushing Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to send troops to Kinshasa and prevent the fall of Kabila's regime. Also neighbouring Uganda sees Rwanda as a hostile country, after clashes between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the Congo. The French comeback The turning point for the Rwandan diplomacy's successes started with the French being able to make a diplomatic comeback in June 2000, orchestrating a UN Security Council condemnation of the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of eastern Congo Kinshasa (Resolution 1304). The Security Council resolution was a victory for the French diplomats, who wrote it. Since the beginning of the war in August 1998, Paris has always been concerned to prevent the de facto partition of the DRC, the second largest francophone country in the world. French diplomacy began to capitalise on the mistakes of the Rwandan and Ugandan invaders summer 2000, according to a 2001 study by the International Crisis Group (ICG). After six days of fighting between their armies in the northeastern city of Kisangani in June 2000 during which some 700 civilians perished, France orchestrated a Security Council condemnation. It called for immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and Uganda forces and noted with concern the continuing illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo. Rwanda and Uganda alone were singled out by name in the Council's demand for a withdrawal of foreign forces. The Security Council also reaffirmed interest in the long-time project of French President Jacques Chirac for an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region. This proposal displeases Rwanda and Uganda, who fear being outnumbered by Francophone Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Central African Republic, as well as Kabila's Southern African allies. They argue this venue would not produce solutions for the Congo's reconstruction and the disarmament of armed groups. Rwanda could however live with the critics by the Security Council, which could have been much tougher. Paris' recognition of the need to disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias, and its call for an end to state support for these forces, reveals that it no longer systematically rejects the security arguments Rwanda uses to justify its presence in the Congo. The UN document also makes no mention of sanctions against Kigali. In order to bring about this rapprochement with France, Kigali seems to have accepted Paris' unwillingness to repent for its role in the 1994 genocide. This change of heart is due in part to France's readiness to forego efforts to undermine Rwanda in multilateral organisations, as well as Kigali's fear of an electoral defeat for the Labour government in the UK following the Republican victory over the Democrats in the US. France's primary interest is to protect its oil-producing friends (Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Angola), and to reassure its francophone African clients that Paris will stand behind them if their regimes are threatened. Paris must demonstrate that it can still win diplomatic battles, the ICG report concludes. So far, the French diplomatic comeback has served the interests of the Kinshasa government. "However the free hand given to Paris does not bode well for the Congolese people if it permits France to continue its past unquestioning support for the Mobutu and then Kabila regimes," the ICG report states. The Joseph Kabila factor In January 2001, Congolese President Laurent Desir� Kabila was assassinated, and with him died one of the best arguments of the Rwandan diplomacy. The late president's stubborn and erratic behaviour had always made it easy for Kigali to justify its presence in the DRC. Joseph Kabila succeeded his father, and soon became the new centre of attention in the region, "seducing" the West with a successful lobbying campaign. Demonstrating real will to peace in his country, Joseph Kabila quickly managed to turn the international opinion's focus away from Rwandan security needs to the legitimate call to respect the territorial integrity of Congo Kinshasa. Within weeks, Joseph Kabila had given the Kinshasa government the credibility his father had spoilt. The sudden change in perspective was clearly demonstrated in the cold reception President Kagame received from the new Bush administration during his trip to Washington in late January and early February 2001. In sharp contrast to the reception it gave the Rwandan president, Washington embraced Joseph Kabila as someone capable of breaking the Congolese impasse. Kagame realized that his claims to be fighting a bad government no longer worked and moved quickly to demonstrate his good faith by meeting with the young Kabila in the US on 1 February. In fact, the political change in Washington was more profound than a wave of popularity for Joseph Kabila. The new American administration has veered sharply from President Clinton's support for Kigali, and freed itself from the once popular view that Kagame represented a 'new generation' of African leaders or any responsibility for policy during the 1994 genocide. The Republicans appear to have little patience for Rwanda's penchant for military solutions to its security problems. When Kagame refused to attend the 15 February summit in Lusaka that was intended to revive the peace process, the Americans responded with an expression of official disappointment. Rwanda subsequently announced its satisfaction with the outcome of the Lusaka summit but internationally, the damage had been done. With American support to Rwanda on the retreat, Joseph Kabila being the new point of attention and the French diplomacy gaining momentum to define the international reactions to the events in the Great Lakes region, Rwanda had to rethink its diplomacy. The Pweto battle The military turning point came in the southeastern Congolese town of Pweto. In late 2000, Rwanda managed to conquer this strategic town from Congolese and Zimbabwean forces. The Rwandans thus seized an enormous stock of war material and provoked the flight of thousands of Forces Arm�es Congolaises (FAC), Interahamwe, and other allied forces into Zambia. Simultaneous Interahamwe efforts to infiltrate northwestern Rwanda collapsed in the face of counterattacks by the Rwandan Army. Since the Pweto military turning point, the Rwandan government reports that it has neutralised the Interahamwe 'division' in Masisi, and heavy fighting is taking place in Shabunda. The ICG study sees the battle of Pweto was a turning point in Rwandan strategy. The rout of the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, Interahamwe, and other FAC allies in the town prompted a debate within the top ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) regime. Some insisted that the victory should be exploited to destroy the Interahamwe in Katanga. Some even advocated pursuing those forces into Zambia, where they had taken refuge. Their case was reinforced by the reluctance of Zambia to turn over those forces to the RPA. Others in Kigali, however, insisted that the diplomatic costs of an operation into neutral Zambia would be too high. The Kigali hawks in fact already had lost this battle. President Kagame did not want to risk further alienation of his Western allies. Kagame's cold reception in Washington finally stopped all plans to further exploit the Pweto victory. On the contrary, Rwandan forces started withdrawing from Pweto weeks after Kagame's Washington visit. Kagame's shift was swift when realising Rwanda had lost the "propaganda war" over the Congo war. In this new climate, renewed military campaigns would have been impossible. Rwanda thus was quick to demonstrate his good faith, and suddenly turned into the advocate of troop withdrawals from the Congo. Rwanda agreed to the UN plan, outlining a withdrawal of all foreign troops and the deployment of UN military observers, and accomplished its withdrawal faster the agreed timetable. Kagame now can point to that Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean forces are those not complying with UN resolutions. New positions The military moves were accompanied by a subtle shift in Kigali's rhetoric concerning the Interahamwe. In his 7 February presentation to the Security Council, Kagame estimated their numbers to be 15,000, a dramatic decrease from previous informal RPF estimates that hovered near 40,000. Moreover, Kagame no longer insists that all of these gunmen need to be brought to justice. The leaders should be arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, he says, but many can be reintegrated into Rwandan society through the gacaca institutions of traditional justice or resettled in West Africa. In other words, there seems to be a greater acceptance by the Rwandan regime of the principle of voluntary repatriation. If so, and if the international community provides financial support, the problem of the Interahamwe can be quickly resolved once Kinshasa stops backing them. Following their presidents' meeting in Washington, discreet negotiations between the Rwandan and Congolese governments continued. Positive signals from Kinshasa helped in part to persuade Kagame to pull the RPA out of Pweto. In a letter to the Security Council, the government of the DRC recognised the security concerns of Rwanda and the need to solve the Interahamwe/ex-FAR issue. Since then, however, there has been no progress. Rwandan, Burundian, and RCD-Goma officials all claim that Joseph Kabila has continued his father's clandestine support for the Interahamwe and other Hutu insurgent movements in Eastern Congo. This issue has the greatest potential for a continuation of the conflict between Kinshasa and Kigali. Point of no return? The latest signals from Kinshasa being a continued clandestine support for the Interahamwe, Rwanda is obviously very worried about this and has re-deployed the units it withdrew from Pweto between Uvira and Fizi-Baraka in order to block further infiltration. If these negative tendencies continue, Rwandan internal policies will not allow the return of the Interahamwe as a force threatening Rwandan security. But has the change in Rwandan diplomacy already reached a point of no return? Would it be possible for Rwanda to embark on new military offensives in Congo Kinshasa if Joseph Kabila's commitment to peace proves a fraud? The question is misleading, as it would be impossible for a Rwandan government not to return to hostilities if the Interahamwe and ex-FAR at any stage returned to threaten the situation in Rwanda. This analysis started in the Rwandan 1994 genocide, and it ends up in the 1994 genocide. "One survives a Genocide in many cases through a mixture of luck, and some very painful personal decisions," the Rwandan ambassador to the US, Dr. Richard Sezibera, told the Armenian National Committee at a genocide forum. "Thus many of the females who survived the Genocide in Rwanda had to let their bodies be abused by the killers; this immediately after the loss of their loved ones, including husbands and children." Such experiences are not forgotten in a few years. - Survival for these people is never a cause for unalloyed rejoicing, because it is tinged with painful memories and the ambivalent conviction that may be the only fitting tribute to the dead is absolute silence, Sezibera continued, describing the trauma of the Rwandans. A genocide is not forgotten in one generation. It never should be forgotten. In a traumatised country, there are many ways of dealing with the trauma, some prefer to forget, and some prefer to shout from the hilltops. There is however one thing the survivors do agree upon, that is that they shall never again be exposed to the same threat. And if the feeling comes up in Kigali that the people might be exposed to such a threat, any government will be short-lived. Then, unimportant details, such as Rwandan popularity in Washington, London or Paris are of utter irrelevance. Time being, the Kagame government can afford a change of its foreign policy, as its security situation generally is well taken care of. Kigali however has its hawks and doves. The very core of the regime is affected by a balance between moderates (lead by Kagame) and more radical Tutsi genocide survivors. These divisions also affect the Rwandan army. When a anti-confrontation foreign policy no longer is affordable, it will quickly be changed, regardless the costs. |
