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Ear to The Ground
By Charles Onyango-Obbo |
Who’ll have a longer political life, Bidandi and Kategaya or Museveni?
May 28, 2003
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Last week President Yoweri Museveni sacked long term buddy Mr Eriya Kategaya, who was First Deputy Premier and minister of Internal Affairs. Along with Mr Kategaya, he dropped minister for Local Government Bidandi Ssali. The two men had been very vocal in their criticism of Mr Museveni’s push to lift the two-terms limit for president in the constitution, and thus open the way for a leader to rule until he or she dies or is murdered by a rival for the sweet chair. Ethics and Integrity minister Miria Matembe, minister of State for Internal Affairs Sarah Kiyingi, and minister for Security Muruli Mukasa also went. Of course, Dr Speciosa Kazibwe had also resigned as Vice President, and Dr Gilbert Bukenya landed the job (you have to be a medical doctor to be VP in Museveni’s Uganda, as indeed the late Dr Samson Kisekka was an “educated medicine man” too). It has been argued in the press that Mr Museveni could have learnt from the rout of former Kenya president Daniel arap Moi’s ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) last December, to get rid of dissenters early before the 2006 elections. That way, unlike KANU, Movement-Museveni will have enough time to overcome the bleeding from a fall-out with top party members, and not be swept away by a united opposition as happened in Kenya. That is one of the good explanations for Mr Museveni’s action – but only as far as the events of the last year go. The comparison between Kenya and Uganda however leads us 12 years back to better understand events in Uganda today. Among other things, why didn’t Mr Moi retire instead of trying to do a Museveni, and amend the constitution to allow him stand for another term? Well, apart from issues of age, the economic crisis in Kenya, and possibly a lingering peasant goodness of heart, Mr Moi didn’t have the choice to stay on. The combined force of the opposition and civil society in Kenya had reached a critical level which would have made any attempt to cling on virtually impossible. How this political balance of forces came to favour civil society and anti-regime politics in Kenya gives us a glimpse into why Mr Museveni is making a try at perpetuating himself in State House. When the “democracy wave” swept the world after the fall of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, many countries in Africa were forced to end one-party rule, liberalise their economies, and hold free elections. None of these changes that happened in Kenya between 1990-92, resulting in the country’s first post-independence multiparty election improved conditions. Repression continued, corruption went out of control and liberalisation didn’t reverse economic decline. One of the conclusions that the international communitywanted to see change reached was that there would be no improvements in Kenya, unless Mr Moi and KANU’s power was weakened, allowing for a hopefully more enlightened opposition to take power. Therefore a lot of effort went into supporting civil society organisations, that would undermine the power of the KANU regime. Thus in Kenya, even environmental organisations were very political. To attract donor funds for your NGO, even if it was a children’s one, it had to have a political agenda of sorts. The result was that by 2000, Kenya had what was reckoned to be the largest civil society sector in Africa after South Africa – most of them politically active to force KANU to change by weakening its power. The response of the Moi government, realising it was losing the grassroots battle was to try and stop funding to civil society organisations by having it channelled through the government. Most donors didn’t go along with that, and responded more by cutting back funding. In short, a lot of international donor money, and diplomatic work went into weakening Mr Moi and KANU. In Uganda, after Mr Museveni took over in 1986, the opposite happened. The international community began from the assumption that Mr Museveni and his government were enlightened, honest, and wanted the best for the country. The problem was that the government institutions were too weak to deliver those good results. The international community came up with millions of dollars to give civil society groups to help government do the job. Thus while in Kenya civil society was funded essentially to undermine Mr Moi, in Uganda it was created in some instances, and supported in most instances so it might be an effective sub-contractor for the government. Thus while in Kenya being anti-Moi almost ensured you donor support, in Uganda being anti-Museveni ensured that you would not get the money. The cash was in being a “partner” to help the government. The implications of this are far-reaching. Because there has been no investment in independent civil politics, it cannot in the foreseeable be a significant check on the attempts to overturn the term limit. People like Mr Kategaya and Mr Bidandi, if they chose to play the role of people like Mr Raila Odinga in Kenya when they fell out with Mr Moi, will have less effect because they don’t have the pro-democracy organisations to work with. They, and donor groups like the European Union who recently recommended that Uganda should go the Kenya way, were among the leading architects of the “No Change” process that made the emergence of such groups very difficult. Politics is like beasts in the jungle. The one that is better fed is stronger and survives. In Uganda, the undemocratic beast is the one that has been well fed. Now it rules the hill. - Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] |
© 2003 The Monitor Publications
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