|
Here we go !!!!!
Buganda's
initial response to this rejection of its claims to leadership was to emphasize
is superiority and on that basis to pursue a policy of separatism. In early
1950's when the Kabaka of Buganda and his ministers turned their thoughts
to independence, they sought the end of overrule not for Uganda as a whole but
just for Buganda, the only part of the protectorate, they argued, that was
ready. As an interim arrangement they proposed the transfer of Buganda affairs
from her Majesty's Colonial office to her majesty's Foreign Office. It was as
if, having played the game of colonialism with extraordinary success, at least
in part because they had sat on the dealer's right throughout, the Baganda
decided that if they could not them selves become the dealer, which it seemed
from the others' attitudes they could not, they had better pick up their
winnings and leave before the dealership changed hands. Neither the proposal nor
the motives it implied, it seems scarcely necessary to add, were received with
great enthusiasm by the other players. The moves were rebuffed by the British
but not before they had further divided Baganda and non-Baganda. Indeed, from
the point of view of the nascent nationalist movement, the breach was all but
complete, since apparently the only structure keeping the country intact was the
colonial government. Thus the healing of this breach and the reincarnation of
Buganda into Uganda became the principle object or the critical
consideration of practically all major political moves in this period. The
considerable amount of manoeuvring that occurred, and that gave Uganda politics
baffling appearance, concerned not so much the question of whether Buganda would
be reincorporated, although it sometimes seemed to be that, but rather the terms
of its reincorporating, the place it and its leaders would occupy in the new
society.
The British government's response to Buganda's
proposal for a separate and foreseeable independence was to reiterate their
intention of keeping the Protectorate together and to require the Kabaka, Mutesa
11, to support that intention. This he was unable to do, and in consequence, in
the fall of 1953, he was summarily deported. It is a minor irony of Uganda's
brief national history that the deportation of Mutesa, for insisting upon
Buganda's separate independence, should have brought about the first healing of
the breach which this very insistence had furthered. But it did, for practically
all nationalists found them selves united in their opposition to this arbitrary
exercise of colonial power. Moreover, since the affair intimately concerned the
Baganda and they were therefore far more engaged than any one else in the
negotiations to secure the Kabaka's return, it effectively put the Baganda in
the forefront of the nascent nationalist movement. Following the success of
these negotiations and the return of Mutesa in 1955, however, the Baganda ceased
to play the dominant role in the nationalist movement. This occurred for two
reasons. First, they came under attack from non-Baganda. The principle party,
the Uganda National Congress (UNC), with several Baganda and a few Northerners
had founded in 1952 and control of which formed the base of Baganda nationalist
leader-ship, began to split over issues related to the Buganda question and
finally splintered decisively in 1959. A year earlier, nationalists mainly from
the Western Province and some from the Eastern Province had formed the Uganda
People's Congress Union (UPU), and in 1960 UPU and the wing of UNC led by Milton
Obote (a Langi, or Northerner) merged to form the Uganda People's Congress
(UPC). UPC's most striking characteristic at the time was the virtual absence of
Baganda among its members.
Second, with the return of the Kabaka in 1955, the common front among the
Baganda politicians split badly as they jockeyed for position in relation to
Mutesa. And here it becomes necessary to introduce another of the principal axes
of Uganda politics: Catholic-Protestant tensions. At the risk of drastically
oversimplifying a very complex subject, the two basic sources of these
tensions may be simply stated: Anglicanism virtually became the established
religion, first in Buganda and subsequently throughout the Protectorate,
and appointments to the administrative chieftainships came to a very large
extent to be governed by religious considerations. In consequence,
and right from the very beginnings of Uganda, the normal competition
between missionaries became a continuing struggle for power among their
adherents, with Protestants trying to maintain their substantial hold on the
chieftainships and Roman Catholics trying to increase the number they
controlled. In 1956, a group of leading Baganda, with the active support of the
Catholic Bishops, took a new tack on their struggle to alter their position in
Buganda society and formed the Democratic Party (DP). In short order DP
became a national party. The hierarchy of the Catholic church, seeing in DP's
formation something akin to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, used the
church's organisation to further its spread, while leading Catholics outside
Buganda, most of whom also felt discriminated against, saw the new party as the
means of securing themselves a fairer share of their district's administrative
posts and began establishing local DP branches. In 1961, direct elections
were held throughout the country, earlier, Buganda had renewed its claim for
development as a separate state, which the British government had again
rejected, and Mutesa and his advisors decided on the tactic of boycotting the
elections. The boycott, it is estimated, was 97% effective -- which clearly
indicated to all concerned that the Kabaka could exercise considerable power
through his administrative system, and that, in consequence, if Uganda were to
secure its independence it would only be through a coalition between the Kabaka
and his followers on the one hand, and leading non-Baganda nationalists, on the
other. As it was, the 3 percent in Buganda who did vote voted overwhelmingly for
the DP candidates, giving the party 20 of the 21 Buganda seats in the national
legislature. These together with the 23 out of 61 seats they won in the rest of
the country permitted DP to organise the first democratically elected government
in Uganda.
It was to be a short lived government, however. For soon there after a
conference held in London decided that new elections would be held in April
1962, and Uganda would become independent six months letter, in October. A
number of difficult constitutional questions concerning Buganda's place in the
new state were at issue in the conference, but what was never seriously at
issue, it seems, was whether or not Buganda would take part in the new state. A
plan was evolved between UPC leaders and several leading Baganda, including
Mutesa, which by granting Buganda a good deal of autonomy, made the necessary
political arrangements for Buganda's participation. At the same time, however,
the fundamental question of leadership in the new state was left unsettled.
Constitutionally, it was agreed that Buganda was to stand in a Federal
relationship to the national state, which meant, among other things, that its
own legislature, the Lukiko, was to decide whether Buganda's representatives to
the national legislature were to be elected directly, by the Buganda electorate,
or elected indirectly, by the Lukiko acting as an electoral collage.
Politically, it appears, the following was agreed upon. One, UPC would not
contest the coming election for Buganda's own legislature, but instead a new
group would be formed under the aegis of the Kabaka. On the strength of the
showing in the boycott, this group could count on winning the election in
Buganda, after which the newly elected Buganda legislature would opt for
indirect elections to the national legislature. Two, the 21 Buganda
representatives would then join with the UPC representatives to form a coalition
government in which Obote would be the Prime Minister and the Baganda would hold
several ministries. And three, in the following year, Mutesa would become
President replacing Queen Elizabeth 11 as Uganda's head of state.
The plan appears in retrospect to have been well conceived. In the
elections for the Buganda legislature, the new group, called Kabaka Yekka (KY),
which combined rather disparate elements among Buganda's political factions,
soundly defeated DP by winning 65 of the 68 elected seats in the Lukiiko and
then chose Buganda's 21 representatives to the national legislature. Two months
later UPC won 37 of the seats out side Buganda, to DP's 24, and with KY formed a
coalition government headed by Obote. Then, eighteen months letter, on the
first anniversary of Uganda's independence, Mutesa succeeded Queen
Elizabeth as Uganda's head of state.
Post-Independence Politics: 1962- 1965
The agreement worked out at the 1961 London Conference and subsequently put
into effect did no more than it was intended to do, however. In particular, it
was not intended to settle the issue of leadership but only to establish the
initial position of the participants and some rules for carrying on the game. It
was not intended to resolve the Buganda question but only to permit the struggle
to be carried on within an independent Uganda. And that struggle indeed went on,
in several forms and several contexts.
To be continued
Back-tracking? No we are done, we are now moving on and fast.
Buganda in Uganda (The bureaucracy) Coming right up. (About time
we face the facts)
The Mulindwas Communication Group "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" |
