Folks,

In the past few weeks we have witnessed an exchange, on Fedsnet between Obote�s  supporters as they have attempts to foist upon us their revisionist history and others who would have nothing to do with this nonsense. One of the ignorami had the temerity to pontificate about things he clearly has no idea about, e.g. �No amount of laying prostrate before the empty Nnamulongo could save Kintu.� Kintu, you will recall, was Buganda�s Katikkiro during the period of the Referendum on the so-called �Lost Counties�. As Buganda�s Kamalabyonna and therefore �Kabaka Ow�ebweru�, he was one of handaful of Baganda who did may not prostrate, much less, kneel before the Kabaka � no matter what his transgression (if any), according to Kiganda etiquette, custom and tradition.

 Rather than boring you with my opinions, I thought it might be enlightening to see what had been written about the events by more informed and authoritative sources.   I turned to a book:

 Grace Stuart Ibingira (GSI) 1980 African Upheavals Since Independence. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

 GSI, a trained lawyer, was an insider who witnessed some of the events he writes about first hand -- having been MP, the UPC�s Secretary General, cabinet Minister (Justice, State) before being detained and imprisoned, along with other UPC Ministers, for about 5 years by Obote. He later served in the Amin government as Ambassador to UN (resigning in Jan. 1974). His better-known book �The Forging of An African Nation� was written before his detention. These two books should be read by anyone who wants to understand the workings of the UPC, what happened, when & why it happened, and just how ruthless & power-drunk Obote is.

 In many ways this fairly well referenced book, uncannily, applies to the present regime; at time so much so that one would only have to replace �Obote� with �Museveni� and �UPC� with �Movement� to describe the current situation. Yet, it was written and published before the Movement had become a reality (I hear Museveni, Kategaya et al started plotting its existence much earlier, possibly in their pre-Tanzania days, but that is another story).

 The book has 3 parts:

Part 1: Nature of the Colonial Legacy (ch. 1-4)

Part 2: The Politics and Practices of Winner-Take-All and Their Consequences  (ch. 5-10)

Part 3: The Future: Some Lessons and Some Basic Principles (ch. 11-13).

 Chapters that are especially important for Uganda are (sections are not numbered in the book, and sub-sections are not given here for brevity): -

Ch. 2 Uganda

a.       Colonization and Consolidation

b.      The Approach of Independence and Its Problems

c.       The Independence Settlement

 Ch. 6 Uganda: Fundamental Causes of the 1966 Revolution

a.       The UPC�s Resolute Determination to Obtain and Exercise Absolute Power

b.      Efforts to Impose a One-Party System

c.       Parliamentary Battles for Reform of Electoral Law

d.      Monopoly and Misuse of the Security Forces

e.       Efforts to Monopolize Government Power

f.        The revival of Primordial Fears

Ch. 7 Uganda: The Immediate Causes of the Revolution

a.       The Exposure of Clandestine Involvement in a Foreign Conflict

b.      Accusations of Profiteering from the Conflict

c.       The Likely removal of Idi Amin and Its Consequences

d.      The UPC Stand on Ochieng�s Motion

e.       The Constitution and Its Restraints

f.        The Seizure of Absolute Power

g.       The Unrestrained Executive and Its Effect on National Unity

h.       The 1971 Coup D�etat

 Chapter 2, perhaps because it deals with pre-independence events, is rather brief. Nevertheless, it attempts to lay the foundation of the post-independence conflicts, if only in passing � esp. in 2 (c).

 Ch. 6 begins thus (my emphasis is italicized, original emphasis will be underlined, as in the original text.):

             �Apolo Milton Obote, as leader of UPC, inherited the independence government on 9 October 1962. On February 22 1966, he abrogated the constitution and concentrated power in his own hands. His declared reasons for this seizure of power are considered in detail later. However, they were allegedly to forestall Kabaka Muteesa�s attempt to employ foreign troops to overthrow the government and to prevent a number of his leading colleagues, whom he arrested, from promoting instability in the party and country. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is wisely said in jurisprudence that a case should never be decided without hearing both parties (audi alteram partem). The case for Obote�s seizure of power, which unleashed Uganda�s instability, has been exhaustively stated by him and his supporters since 1966 in the press, in the Parliament, in court cases, and in varied literature1. But there has been to date no coherent explanation or alternative interpretation of what truly happened.�

 �In 1967 while in exile, Fredrick Muteesa II, the former Kabaka of Buganda and president of Uganda, wrote a book giving a sketchy explanation of what had happened, largely omitting the real story except for his battle with the Uganda Army2.  I can only think of one likely reason for such an omission and that was fear for his relatives and friends still living in Uganda, some of them in prison at the time. Obote had demonstrated his ruthlessness by unleashing his army on largely defenseless civilians. Accurate disclosures that credibly contradicted his reasons for his seizure of power might well have triggered retribution against any of Muteesa�s relatives, friends, and allies within his reach. But why did Obote abrogate the Ugandan Constitution and seize dictatorial power? It is my considered opinion that even without the Ochieng motion (considered later) � which censured him in Parliament on 4 February 1966 and sparked off the revolution a few weeks later � there would still have been some revolutionary upheaval in the country in the subsequent months because of his relentless and increasingly ruthless efforts on al fronts to monopolize power and eliminate all opposition, inside and outside the UPC.

At the heart of the Ugandan revolutions of 1966 and 1971 was the insatiable desire for monopoly of power by the UPC leadership. The independence settlement had left a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and the judiciary branches of government that assured the ordinary citizens against arbitrary misuse of power, in addition to giving some limited autonomy to the ethnic groups without weakening the central government. Soon after independence, the prime minister set out to concentrate power in his own hands through methods that involved abuse of authority and resulted in instability.  It is appropriate to examine this process of unsurpation (sic) and abuse through four basic areas of government: (1) the ruling party and its philosophy, (2) control of central and local governments, (3) the forces of law and order and their functions in the new state, and (4) the primacy of the executive branch and the emasculation of the legislative branch after 1967.

�The UPC�s Resolute Determination to Obtain and Exercise Absolute Power

 Some of the most effective pressure exerted through the Legislative Council in the African colonies� demands for self-government and independence was to use the very standards of democracy as practiced in Britain, such as universal adult franchise and representative and responsible government. Obote was one of the most articulate advocates of a democratic system in Uganda and his public pronouncements up to independence (and indeed up to the 1966 revolution) bear this out. But in fact while he was outwardly espousing this, he was privately preparing to use brutal illegal force, not against the colonialists, who had already agreed to leave anyway, but against any Ugandan political party other than UPC that inherited power. A few months before independence, as minister of justice responsible for constitutional affairs, I accompanied him to London to press the British government to advance Kenya�s independence date. In our free time, Obote introduced me first to the secretary of a certain European embassy in London with whom he had had a long-established contact. When we later returned to our hotel, my astonishment was immense as he categorically told me ha had made preparations to overthrow the DP government by force if the UPC lost the preindependence (sic) elections in April 1962. The diplomat�s country, according to him, had already agreed to provide the necessary training and materials, such as arms. As a founding member of the UPC party who had sat in on all its meetings and as its legal adviser who, with the late John Kakonge, had largely drafted the party constitution and manifesto, I knew it was never the UPC party policy, in private or public, to seek unlawful seizure of power from the government, although we would do everything permitted by law to win elections.  This assertion, the first to put m on the alert, was followed by many mor e serious statements and actions. After becoming prime minister, Obote would often confide in some of his close colleagues (like B.K. Kirya and myself) that he would never under any circumstances relinquish power voluntarily. He would quote from John Milton�s Paradise Lost, relating how Lucifer, having been deposed from heaven, told other fallen angels, �to rule is worth ambition though in hell. It is better to rule in hell than serve in heaven.� The implication was unmistakably emphasized that it was preferable to turn Uganda into chaos in order to stay on top than to lose to another party in a peaceful election.

�Of course, all (or most) political leaders want to attain, hold, or exercise power. But what happens when the objective is to attain and hold power at all costs and for all the time, as was Obote�s real ambition? Conflict and violence sooner or later become inevitable, especially when there is a powerful opposition as there was in Uganda. Most of Obote�s close colleagues in the party and government looked at him initially as an honorable man, especially as his statements seldom betrayed his real intentions. Similarly, Parliament and the country at large were prepared to give support to his administration. He had a chance to become a great Ugandan leader; although not charismatic, he was intelligent, articulate, and a nationalist��

More to come later, as time allows, and/or need arises.

{Aside #1: do you folks know that the man Museveni killed some years back was not Obote�s father? Obote�s biological father died in the 1920s of leprosy and he was adopted by the man Kaguta had slaughtered. Obote�s early education � and that of some of his colleagues � was due to a Muganda man called Nalwerimidde who had earlier gone to Lango. But this, too, is another story.

Aside #2: Notice the similarity of language and attitude toward peaceful transfer of power between Obote (with regardi to handing over to DP in case of  lawful electoral defeat) and Museveni (with regard to handing over �his army� during the last election). Dictators are cut from the same cloth.

Aside #3: I hear Ssekabaka Muteesa II wrote �the real story� and left it somewhere for publication some 50 years or so after his death. I suppose that, too, is another story�

Aside #4: My guess of identity of the European country that was read to assist Obote in overthrowing the government of Uganda is the former USSR or one of its satellites.} 



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