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Adirri !!
politics so set by a single tension, however, must to some extent be an
incomplete politics, one mirroring only a part of the strains to which the
society is subject. And, indeed, other strains do exist in murder Uganda, and
its politics has been, in this sense, incomplete. Some of these, such as the
civilian-military tensions or those between Northern and Southern tribal
groupings, have impinged directly on the handling of the Buganda question and so
have found _expression_ in the political alignments which that question has
generated. And one tension, deriving from the competitive relations between the
Roman Catholics and Anglican churches, has had an independent effect on Uganda's
politics. But several others, notably the tensions deriving from class or
economical differences and from Uganda's relations with Kenya and Tanzania, have
implied alignments rather different from the alignments on the Buganda question
and have so far not played an important part in the country's politics, at least
not a part at all commensurate with their importance in society general. It
seems unlikely that this condition will last much longer, however. A politics in
which basic strains are directly reflected in proportion to their importance in
a society, that is, a "Complete Politics", is a limiting or theoretical
condition which presumably rarely or never occurs empirically, at least not in
this complex societies. But political systems do generally tend towards
completeness, to move or evolve in that direction. The reasons for this tendency
are several, but basically two ideas are involved. One, a society's strain and
tensions are held to build content, and its basic strain to breed widespread
discontent; and two, such discontent is assumed to find its way eventually into
the society's political process, by one means or another. Often it appears
because those who feel aggrieved succeed in formulating their grievances,
organising themselves, and making their complaints a public concern, thereby
translating the underplaying tensions into politically consequential issues.
Alternatively, the tensions may simply continue to mount and the discontent to
grow, in which case those affected will eventually express them selves
collectively in some form of overt, often violent behaviour and thereby
automatically introduce the underplaying tensions into the political process. In
one way or another, then, a society's basic strains tend to become reflected in
its politics, which is to say that its politics tends to move towards
completeness.
Something of this sort is likely to occur in
Uganda, and it is therefore to bare in mind the limitations of the preceding
analysis. For like its subject matter, the analysis has also been incomplete,
and for the same reason: it has concerned itself almost wholly with the Buganda
question and has taken up other politically relevant strains in the society only
insofar as they have impinged on the handling of that question or have been
reflected in the alignments surrounding it. In particular, it has not examined
the economical sources of strain in present-day Uganda, since so far none of the
resulting tensions has infact played an organising part in Uganda's politics.
Some have not became sufficiently pronounced to give rise to wide spread
discontent; some have been so overlaid with other tensions as to obscure the
economic basis of the discontent from those concerned; some have been formulated
and expressed by organized groups but owing to the political
leaders'concetration on the Buganda question and related matters have not become
salient political issues. For the reasons given above, though, it seems likely
that this situation will not continue and that instead some of these will play a
much a much more important part in Uganda's politics in the future than they
have in the past. Their identifications at this point will thus serve the double
purpose of suggesting both some of the limitations of the preceding analysis and
some of the features of Uganda's economy which, because they are sources of
strain in the society, are likely to give rise in the fairly short-run to
politically important issues. Uganda, like other East African countries, has a
community of Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) who form at most about one percent
of its population and whose relations with Uganda's Africans have been a
continual source of strain. Although defined by some as a communal tension, it
seems to be basically a class tension, for its source is the Asian's heretofore
virtual monopoly of the distributive sector of the economy (including produce
marketing and processing operations as well as retail trade). Their economic
power has been reduced some what in recent years, through government sponsored
programmes to developed producers' cooperatives and to Africanize retail trade
(and the tension has also lessened some what), but it remains considerable
never the less and is of obvious importance. For Uganda's principal cash crops,
cotton and coffee, are grown on thousands of small scale, family-run farms or
Shambas, not on plantations or estates. Those engaged specifically in the
marketing operations, through which these crops are bought together and made
ready for export, thus not only influence Uganda's overseas earnings but, of
more importance internally, they seem visible to control, and in fact do
measurably affect, the cash earnings received by the bulk of the population for
their products. The tension has been compounded, and to some extent obscured, by
the Asian community's aloofness and implicit claim to a social standing which
most Africans are unprepared to accord. But its basis is the Asians'visibly
dominant economic position, and as long as that remains, African discontent and
resulting anti-Asian boycotts and rioting--instances of which have occurred in
the past, most recently in Buganda in 1959--will also remain potentially
important in Uganda's politics.
In an underdeveloped agricultural country, land is
simultaneously the most important means of production and the most important
means of subsistence, and its control is inevitably a focus of tension. So far
large land-holding has existed only in Buganda, where the administrative chiefs,
both in their private capacities and, untill president Obote's 1966 reforms,
ex-officio, have controlled extensive tracts. Any tension over control of land
has therefore been but one element in the more general tension in Buganda
between higher and lower, between the rulers and ruled. The economic tension is
unlikely to remain so embedded, however, particular if large scale, capitalistic
farming should become more general that it has been. But of probably greater
potential importance is the role this tension may come to play else where in the
country. For the government is engaged in a program of surveying and registering
the thousands of small customary holdings throughout Uganda, Preparatory to
converting them into privately-owned holdings in order to encourage the
formation of a market in land. Numerous local incidents have occurred in
connection with the surveying alone, but these would seem to be only the
beginning. For land markets in areas that combine subsistence farming with
cash-crop production commonly bring in their train speculative buying, tenant
farming, a particular form of debt bondage, and, politically the most
troublesome of all, a landless rural proletariat. Although mainly an
agricultural country, Uganda is not without industrial development, and hence it
is not with out an urban labour force and the associated tensions. These have
not been reflected in its political arena partly because the industrial labour
force proper is still so small, but also partly because untill recently Kenyans
played a leading role in Uganda's labour movement and as such had little
influence on an independent Uganda's politics. Both of these dampening effects
are lessening now, at the same time that school leavers and graduates are
migrating to the industrial areas more rapidly than jobs are being created.
Moreover, private capital, now being drawn not only from expatriate sources but
also and increasingly from local mercantile sources, is becoming progressively
more important in Uganda's industrial development, and this capital is by and
large highly concentrated-- for example, one family-owned complex of enterprises
accounts for some ten per cent of the government's total revenue from taxes. It
thus seems likely that this classic tension will also become increasingly
pronounced.
Another class-like tension that has so far not
played an important part in post-independence politics revolves about the
distribution on income among urban-area Africans. On the surface this seems
to derive from the market differences that exist in access to education and
consequently in educational attainments and associated styles of life. But the
more fundamental source of the tension is the highly skewed income structure
that Uganda inherited at independence and that initially came into been not in
order to elicit the kinds of effort and initiative needed in an independent
economy but in order to induce expatriates, and to some extent
trained Asians and Africans as well, to man the administrative posts of a
dependent, colonial polity and economy. The existence of such an income
structure, and of the highly visible differences in well-being it supports, is
likely to become increasingly difficult to justify, particularly as the economy
moves into a phase of import-substitution and consumer austerity, as it must if
it is to developed. Finally, brief mention should be made of the fact that
politically relevant strains with in Uganda have arisen as a result of its
association with Kenya and Tanzania in the East African Common Services
Organisation (EACSO). This has been mainly an economic association, concerned
with marketing and infrastructure matters, and only secondarily a
political association, but specifically political tensions have developed in the
course of continuing negotiations which the three countries have carried on
regarding both the future of EACSO and, even more tension-inducing, the
possibility of political federation.
All of these sources of tension and strains exist
in Uganda in varying degrees, the same are already important loci of discontent.
Nevertheless, none has so far substantially influenced the organisation or
conduct of the country's politics, and they have therefore not been taken into
account in the present analysis. At the same time, as the above mere listing
indicates, the preceding examination of Uganda's politics in terms of the role
of Buganda question alone has by no means constituted an exhaustive treatment of
the subject, more broadly conceived.
(Taken from Boston University Papers on Africa:
"Transition in Africa Politics" by J. Butler and A. A.
Castaguo.)
To be
continued
The integrative factors coming
up (Ni Adirii tu)
The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" |
