Africa Direct Publications
Uganda: how Britain is helping to recolonise Africa
Barry Crawford, May 1994.
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Contents
1. When democracy means recolonisation
2. How Britain helped to rig the Ugandan elections
3. Uganda: from colonisation to recolonisation
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When democracy means recolonisation
The debate about bringing democracy to Africa is really a discussion
about
recolonising the continent, argues Barry Crawford.
When the Cold War ended, a new 'conditionality' was imposed on Africa
by the
Western powers. It was variously described as 'good governance',
'transparency' and democracy. Warren Christopher, the US secretary of
state,
described the West's new policy towards Africa as a step forward from
the old
Cold War relations: 'During the long Cold War period, policies
towards Africa
were often determined not by how they affected Africa, but by what
advantage
they brought to Washington or Moscow.' Christopher promised that the
Clinton
administration would make a clean break. Henceforth 'an enduring
commitment
to democracy and human rights' would be the hallmark of America's
relations
with Africa (Economist, 29 May 1993).
However it was presented, the new policy of bringing democracy and
human
rights to Africa reflected a new assertiveness in the West's dealings
with
the continent. Seizing upon its ideological victory over communism,
the West
took the moral high ground and lectured Africa about responsible
government.
In all the discussions about the courrupt and despotic nature of
African
governments, the West's record of backing Africa's worst despots was
largely
overlooked.
Stalinism was not the only casualty of the end of the Cold War.
African
socialism and the politics of African liberation were also
discredited. This
has prevented resistance to the imposition of Western austerity
programmes
from having any clear political expression. Having endured economic
stagnation during the 'lost decade' of the eighties, most African
politicians
were all too aware of the social costs that austerity programmes
entailed.
Yet the absence of any alternative strategies prevented opposition to
the
programmes from acquiring any political momentum. The Western powers
were in
a position to renegotiate their relations with Africa on terms even
more
favourable to themselves. It is in this cotext that the African
democracy
debate must be seen.
The constituent assembly elections held in Uganda on 28 March 1994
consolidated power in the hands of Yoweri Museveni's ruling
organisation, the
National Resistance Movement (NRM). Britain and the other Western
powers are
happy to pay lip-srvice to the merits of Museveni's 'no party'
or 'movement'
democracy. Museveni boasts about having the full backing of the
American and
British governments for his version of democracy. Museveni has said
that his
government is under 'no pressure whatsoever and will continue to
receive aid
and assistance from Western donors' (Minutes of security meeting held
in
State House, Entebbe, 26 September 1992).
Museveni is a favoured African leader of the nineties. Edward Clay,
the
British High Commissioner in Uganda, sang the country's praises in
the run-up
to the March 1994 elections:
'In 1990 when Douglas Hurd....first talked about good governance, he
mentioned Uganda as a case in point, a pretty example, where greater
efforts
are being made in an evolutionary way, which we approve, to improve
the
standard of government, to try to make government responsible to the
wishes
and interests of the people who are governed and try to involve the
people in
the process of government...We have already made known that we will
help with
some the of the cost of the elections. we have said Britain will
provide
ballot papers which will be done according to the requirement of the
[constituent assembley] commission. We will support that. For the
moment,
it's not for us to choose for Ugandans what mode of elections to
follow.'
(Sunday Vision, 21 November 1993)
Yet the political process underway in Uganda gives the lie to Western
claims
that democracy and 'transparency' are the cornerstones of their
policy
towards Africa in the post-Cold War period (see 'How Britain helped
rig the
Ugandan elections'). Western sponsorship of African leaders is not
determined
by a commitment to foster democracy in Africa. Rather, it is all
about
establishing a new set of client relationships, since the old ones
have been
rendered obsolete with the passing of the Cod War.
As long as Western interests are being prioritised, any form of
government
will do. High Commissioner Clay can say that it is not for Britain to
dictate
to Ugandans what mode of elections to follow, but Britain has already
adopted
president Museveni as its man in Uganda. This has nothing to do with
Museveni's commitment to democracy and everything to do with the fact
that he
has proved willing to force through crippling austerity measures in
the name
of structural adjustment programmes, and has the military capacity to
enforce
order in the face of the sharply deteriorating living standards which
have
resulted.
Uganda's subordination to Western diktat is becoming ever more
pronounced,
three decades after Uganda won its independence from Britain. Of
course, the
end of colonialism did not free Uganda from foreign intervention. The
constitutional arrangements which Britain instituted at Uganda's
independence
in 1962 frustrated the development of a nationalist programme and a
coherent
Ugandan state.
Although Britain considered Milton Obote, the nationalist leader, to
be a
moderate, it sought to place constraints upon his ability to advance
any form
of African socialism which might threaten British interests. The
preservation
of the institution of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, was intended to
serve as
a moderating influence upon the nationalists, since the authority of
the
Kabaka rested upon old ties of kinship and upheld arrangements which
were
rooted partly in African custom, and partly in colonial practices. By
getting
nationalist agreement on a federal form of government which respected
these
arrangements in Buganda, the scope of Ugandan nationalism was
restricted.
The federal arrangement, along with Uganda's narrow economic base,
gave rise
to instability from the outset. Tensions between the nationalists and
the
Kabaka poisoned Ugandan politics. By 1966 the situation became
untenable and
resulted in Obote siezing state power and abolishing the federation.
His
subsequent nationalisation measures put his government on a collision
course
with Britain. Obote's 'Left Turn' placed him on the wrong side of the
Cold
War divide, and subsequent British backing for Idi Amin's military
coup came
as no surprise. Amin's loyalty to Britain had been tried and tested
in Kenya,
where he had fought the anti-colonial liberation movement, the Mau
Mau.
Yet Amin in turn was also compelled to nationalise to preserve the
economy.
By that time his regime had become an embarrassment to Britain. It
took eight
years and the deaths of some 300 000 people before the rule of Amin
was
brought to an end. Attempts at bringing about civilian government
fianally
gave rise to the re-election of Obote, in late 1980. While the second
Obote
administration received British support, Museveni's dissident army
received
British contacts from as early as 1984. By the time his forces
entered
Kampala and seized power in 1986, it was assured of British backing.
British
recognition for Museveni's military government was immediate. For the
second
time, Britain had backed a military takeover in Uganda.
British backing for Museveni has been substantial. The civil service
is
trained largely with British assistance. Britain initiated a
rehabilitation
project at the Institute of Public Administration in Kampala in 1989,
at a
reported cost of �400 000. In March 1990, the British minister for
overseas
development, Lynda Chalker, officiated at the opening of the first
phase of
the project and announced a further �450 000 grant for the project's
completion (New Vision, 9 March 1990).
Museveini rewarded Britain by selling off state assets at knockdown
prices.
In July 1992, the government released a list of over 100 enterprises
due for
immediate privitisation. Before doing so at hime, the government
advertised
the affected enterprises in the foreign media, in particular the
London
Guardian. It also secretly sold companies without tendering. The
Agricultural
Enterprises, together with its six subsidiaries, was sold for $7.6m -
although the value of its assets was put at $36m. The government also
agreed
to take over responsibility for the company's debts which amounted to
$4.2m.
Kampala has become a haven for foreign investors who are rushing in
to make a
quick killing.
The sound economic management with which the Western powers credit
Museveni
is lost on the swelling numbers of unemployed Ugandans. Between June
and
September 1992, over 1000 senior and middle level officer posts in
the civil
service were axed. All told, a total of 60 000 men an women got the
chop. Thy
have to look for work in the miniscule private sector or go to till
land in
the villages.
Meanwhile Museveni has continued to mortgage Uganda to foreigners.
The
Kampala International Hotel is now in the hands of Sheraton, and the
East
African Steel Corporation at Jinja is leased to a Taiwanese company
for an
annual $100 000 - 'chicken-feed', as some commentators put it (New
African,
September 1992)
Toeing the Western line has only impoverished Uganda further. When
Museveni
seized power in 1986, Uganda ranked as the twelfth poorest country,
with a
per capita income of $230. A structural adjustment plan, instigated
by the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, was implemented the
following
year. By 1993 Uganda ranked as the wold's fourth poorest country
(after
Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia) with a per capita income of $170.
Uganda's export earnings were $466m in 1986; by June 1992 they stood
at
$177m. Uganda's debt rose from $1.2 billion in 1985, to $2.7 billion
in 1992.
Yet foreign donors have stood behind Museveni. In 1991, foreign aid
accounted
for 86 per cent of government spending. An Oxfam report of December
1993
presented the situation in stark figures. Social welfare indicators
are among
the worst in Africa. Infant mortlity is 118 per thousand live births.
The
introduction of user-fees in the health sector has resulted in
falling
hospital attendence and a consequent rise in mortality. Increased
fees for
education and inadequate public investment in schools has led to a
crisis in
education, with an increasing number of children - especially young
girls -
being withdrawn ('Mutilateral debt as an obstacle to recovery: the
case of
Uganda', paper prepared for European NGO Meeting on mutilateral debt,
The
Hague, 4 December 1993). Meanwhile, military spending continued to
grow. The
World Bank estimates that it constituted at least 53 per cent of
total
government spending in 1992.
Alongside his compliance with Western economic prescriptions,
Museveni has
revived the debate around the restoration of the various historic
kingdoms of
Uganda. The ceremonial coronation of Ronald Mutebi as the thirty-
sixth Kabaka
of Buganda took place in July 1993. While the king has no formal
political
power, the revival of the institituion is likely to set a precedent
and mark
a revival of 'traditionalist' as opposed to nationalist politics.
This is
very much in line with contemporary Western thinking about Africa,
which
blames much of Africa's economic failures and political instability
on
African nationalism, and favours a return to traditionalism.
Western intervention in Uganda, spearheaded by Britain, has reduced
Uganda to
a Western client state. The Ugandan people are having to pay a high
price for
the implementation of the austerity measures demanded by Western
institiutions. As Museveni's compliance with these programmes earns
him
stronger Western backing, so the abrogation of Uganda's sovereignty
continues.
How Britain helped rig the Ugandan elections
The British government boasts about its role in helping Uganda along
the road
to democracy. Barry Crawford asks what gives Britain the right to
lecture
Uganda about democracy?
The British government has praised Uganda's constituent assembly
elections,
held on 28 March 1994, as the fairest in Uganda's hisory and a major
step
towards democracy. President Yoweri Museveni's 'no-party' democracy,
in which
political parties are banned, has been given the British seal of
approval as
a serious attempt to achieve political progress and transcend the
tribal and
regional divisions which are said to have plagued Uganda since
independence
in 1962. Britain has presented itself as a supportive, though
non-interventionist, player in Uganda's democratic awakening.
But what is Britain doing interfering in the democratic process of a
sovereign state? What gives British politicians the right to lecture
Ugandans
about 'good governance' and democracy? Imagine the uproar there would
be if a
group of African politicians took it upon themselves to advise the
British
about how to manage their governmental crises.
The suggestion that democracy has been advanced by one iota in Uganda
thanks
to Britain's tutorship is laughable. Behind the sham of democratic
elections,
Britain is overseeing the consolidation of a military dictatorship
and the
prostration of Uganda before the West.
The elections may have been 'free' in the most technical sense of the
word.
But they offered little choice to Ugandans. The 'no-party'
arrangement was
designed to stifle political debate. There was never any doubt that
Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) would be returned to
power.
The elections were a fraud. But they were praised by the British
government,
which has been a strong supporter of Museveni's government ever since
it
seized power in 1986. Britain is an unashamed apologist for the 'no-
party'
system, and presented the constituent assembly elections as an
important
stage in a process of creating representative government. By
providing ballot
boxes and helping foot the bill for the elections, Britain's role has
boosted
the international standing of the NRM. Britain's backing has given
legititimacy to a regime which few Ugandans support. Museveni's men
shot
their way to power in 1986, six years after starting a guerrilla war
against
an elected government. In the 1980 election which brought Milton
Obote to
power, Museveni's party had won just one seat. Museveni himself came
a poor
third in the constituency he contested. Nevertheless, it appears that
Britain
developed close ties with Museveni as early as 1984 when he was still
a
dissident guerrilla leader.
Once in power, Museveni recieved immediate recognition from Britain,
and has
basked in the warm glow of British approval ever since. He has proved
to the
Western powers that he is their man. Socialist rhetoric
notwithstanding,
Museveni has complied to the letter with the terms given by the World
Bank
and International Monetary Fund. His willingness to go further still
down the
austerity road in the post-Cold War nineties has sealed this
relationship
with the West.
The process of removing political parties from debate dates back to
the
toppling of Milton Obote's government in a military coup0 led by
Brigadier
Basilio Okello on 27 July 1985. Okello was ousted in turn by
Museveni's
National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. Opposition parties were
restricted
and later banned as the 'Aims of the Revoultion' proclaimed:
'The establishment by force, if necessary, of a one-party "popular
democracy"
in Uganda....democracy is to be defined at all times solely by the
National
Resistance Movement and the high command of the National Resistance
Army....only NRM is allowed to operate in the country such that the
other
political parties, ie, UPC, DP, CP and NLP will cease to exist as
required by
the revolution.' (Quoted in Uganda Peoples Front/Army Open letter,
June 1989,
Document No 12)
During the first six years in office, Museveni consolidated his power
by
waging war upon dissident forces and repressing all opponents. The
NRA
numbers 300 000 men. According to a United Nations report, Uganda's
military
expenditure in relation to human development is the third highest in
the
world, behind Iraq and Iran.
The assault upon political parties was wide-ranging. The regions of
the north
and east of the country were strongly opposed to Museveni. The defeat
of
dissident armies and the subjugation of the civilian population was
achieved
through a brutal 'pacification' programme. Indiscriminate massacres
were
conducted by the NRA in Gulu district in October and November 1988.
During
July 1989, a scorched earth policy was implemented by the special
brigade
mobile forces of the 80th battalion under Major Katagara in the
districts of
Kumi and Soroti. Several hundred villagers were butchered.
In one incident at Kumi, 60 youths were crammed into rail wagons and
died.
Their deaths were put down by various witnesses as either suffocation
or
incineration. The commander of the army, Major General Salim Saleh
publically
apologised to the people for the incident but went on to say that
this
admission was in itself 'a clear manifestation and democracy by the
NRM
government'. In fact, Salim Saleh could openly admit to the killing
because
Museveni had no intention of bringing those responsible to trial,
having
blamed the atrocities on the rebels who 'were hiding among the
population'
(New African, November 1989).
In order to crush dissident forces, the authorities issued leaflets
to
villagers instructing them to evacuate their homes and move to
resettlement
camps. Their food stocks were destroyed. Those who refused to move
were
presumed to be dissidents and were liable to be shot on sight. In an
inteview
with Caroline Lamwaka of New Vision, Museveni spelled out the
strategy:
'It is precisely because of what we insisted on, this separation of
law-abiding citizens from those who happen to be bandits. Therefore,
people
who were opposing us on this issue were actually murderers of
civlians.
Because they wanted civilians to be killed'.
[Lamwaka] 'On the issue of evacuating the population?'
[Museveni] 'Yes, on the evacuation policy. So those who are opposing
us are
actual enemies of the population whether they know it or they don't
know,
whether they are conscious or not, or whether they are aware or not
aware.
The end result of the position of opposing our evauation plan was
actually to
have the population killed accidentally or even sometimes by design
by some
undisciplined elements.'(27 June 1989)
In Kasese district alone, around 120 000 villagers were evacuated
(New Vision
23 February 1990). Operation Pacification resulted in over 700 deaths
in the
north. Commenting on this, the minister of state for defence, Major
General
Tinyefunza, was uncontrite:
'The NRA took few captives in battles because most of them were
simply sent
to heaven....I would not mind killing 700 or 7000 if they behaved in
such [a]
manner as to become military targets.' (Citizen, No 45, 22 May 1991)
Museveni himself has bragged about NRA massacres, as after a
slaughter at
Corner Kilak:
'The rebels attacked us [NRA soldiers] at a place called Corner
Kilak, 20
miles south of Kitgum town. They came in wild, singing and shouting.
Our
people massacred those chaps. They approached our troops frontally.
This gave
us a very good chance because they exposed themselves; on Sunday
[January 14
1987] we surrounded them and massacred them. We masacred them very
badly.'
(The Standard, 21 January 1987)
The dissident movements, with the exception of the Lord's Resistance
Army,
have all been defeated. In the process, civilian populations suffered
terrible abuses. The NRA is reported to be the worst culprit. There
are
widespread reports of NRA looting, torture, abduction and rape in
villages in
regions where dissidents were pursued. Fear of the NRA has prevented
villagers from cultivating their lands. In the area east of the Nile,
this
has resulted in the worst famine since independence (The People, 14
October
1992). In November 1990, a helicopter crashed at Kitgum town
barracks; it had
been overloaded with bags of simsim, the local staple, confiscated
from
villagers as part of an NRA scorched earth policy (Weekly Topic, 11
January
1991).
In addition to waging war against dissidents, harsh repression has
been meted
out to unarmed political opponents. At a public meeting in Kitgum,
the
district attorney presing over the meetin took offence at a
contribution from
a civilian in the audience. After the meeting the civilian was beaten
unconscious by the district attorney's bodyguards. (The Monitor, 11-
15
February 1994).
Reports of atrocities in Gulu emerged in the wake of the NRA's 'panda-
gari'
operation. Some 18 northern political leaders, including Democratic
Party
organising secretary Zachary Olum, were arrested and severely
tortured. Major
General Tinyefunza, commander of the operation and minister of state
for
defence, said that the leaders were arrested for preaching political
pluralism in their home areas (The Citizen, 29 May 1991). In January
1992 the
party's secretary general, and its national publicity secretary were
put on
trial for treason. When the DP threatened to hold an illegal rally in
May
1993, Museveni responded, saying: 'If they want to see dead bodies,
let them
go ahead with the rally.' (Daily Nation, Nairobi, 8 May 1993)
Next in the firing line was the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), the
one-time
ruling party of Milton Obote. The party's assistant secretary general
and 16
other officials were arrested and detained in January 1992. By
issuing
treason charges against political opponents, the regime was able to
institute
detention without trial for 15 months. Over 100 people were detained
in this
manner in the first quarter of 1991, according to a Ugandan human
rights
report (The Citizen, 29 May 1991).
There are also accounts of NRA hit squads. Before the former
secretary of the
Uganda Airlines Association, Ochieng Odoi Osenge, was able to
implicate the
government in using the airline to run South African arms to Croatia,
he was
shot dead by unknown white gunmen. NRA officers appeared suddenly
from
nowhere an took his body. Soldiers prevented an independent autopsy
and ten
cemented the body into the ground, so preventing a funeral (New
African,
August 1992).
The press has not escaped either. A cabinet minute of 1990 is
instructive:
'It was now clear that the government had to take ruthless measures
to cean
up the field of journalism, and to ensure that Ugandan jounalists
grasped the
tenets of national aspirations....we will not tolerate any journalist
insulting or ridiculing the National Resistance Army (NRA) for
whatever
reason.' (Minute 40, 'Freedom of the press', third meeting of the
Ugandan
cabinet held on 1 February1990)
Editors of Uganda Confidential, the Citizen, the Guide, Economy, and
Mulungera were all arrested and charged with various offences (New
African,
April 1992). In August 1993, the government alleged that privately
owned
newspapers published government secrets, and directed all government
departments and parastatals to withhold advertisements from the
private
press. The Commissioner to the constituent assembly, Stephen Akabwai,
said he
will be 'giving marks to the stories' written about the constituent
assembly
(Weekly Topic, 27 August 1993)
The local government elections of March 1992, indicated the kind of
democracy
Museveni had in mind. Apart from arresting and charging opponents
with
treason, other restrictive practices were implemented. Instead of a
secret
ballot, voters were made to queue up behind their chosen candidate,
thereby
exposing themselves to harassment. The candidates themselves were not
allowed
to campaign, and had to leave election gatherings before
presentations about
them could be made. Despite all this, the Ugandan people still
managed to
express their party political allegiances.
The Constitutional Commission presented a draft constitution to
Museveni on
31 Secember 1992. Predictably, it recommended suspending party
activity for
at least another seven years after which tim a referendum would be
held on
the issue. Once elected, the constituent assembly would open a
constitutional
debate in which multi-party democracy would be considered. Yet the
framework
within which the recent constituent assmbly elections were conducted
left
nothing to chance.
The demarcation of electoral constituencies was rigged to favour the
NRA.
Museveni appointed an old schoolmate of his, Stephen Akabwai, as
electoral
commissioner, empowered to demarcate constituencies and supervise the
whole
electoral process. He took all of three weeks to demarcate 214 new
constituencies. Opposition figures accused him of under-representing
areas
where opposition parties enjoy support, such as the densely populated
Bushenyi, Masaka and Mbale districts. The 137 737 voters in county
Nakifuma,
in Eastern Iganga, were all in one constituency. In the western
district of
Rukungiri, there was boundary shifting, allegedly to reduce
opposition to
Amama Mbabazi, Museveni's right-hand man. All opposition candidates
in Mwenge
county were set to eliminate each other, having been lumped in one
constituency.
Despite this, the Ugandan electorate produced a verdict which may
prove
problematic for the NRM. Official figures gave 144 of the 214 seats
to the
NRM. (While candidates stood as individuals and were not permitted to
state
party affiliation, the candidates indicated whether or not they
supported a
'movement system' as opposed to multi-partyism.) There are an
additional 74
seats requied to make up the full complement of the constituent
assembly. Of
these, Museveni is entitled to nominate 10 personally, while the NRA
is to
nominate 10 more.
The NRM has gained the numbers to win the arguments, but not the
consesnsus
it needs to justify its aim of abolishing other political parties.
Some 85
per cent of Uganda's seven million registered voters turned out to
select the
individuals offered. In the north and north-east, NRM candidates did
very
badly. Nearly three quarters of existing parliamentarians lost. Betty
Bigombe, the notorious Minister for Pacification Resident in the
North, was
beaten into third place.
Aside from the defeats of prominent NRM figures, the NRM had failed
to
achieve its central objective - the destruction of the opposition
parties.
The NRM's losses were to a large extent the UPC's gains. The UPC has
re-emerged as a credible organisation. Ugandans also used their vote
to
discredit the government's economic policies - Museveni's whole
economic team
was rejected, including the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance.
Furthermore, the assertion that 'no-party democracy' is needed to
transcend
tribal and regional allegiances looks hollow, since the elections
have
exposed a deepening of the divide between the southern and western
regions on
the one hand, and the northern and eastern regions on the other.
In fact, tribal thinking resides at the top of the NRM, as evidenced
by
Museveni himself:
'I know the weakness of every tribe in Uganda....the Acholi are like
sheep
being prepared for slaughter. They are so ignorant that even if you
put a
knife on their throat, they will not believe that you will kill
them....The
only difference between the Acholi and the Baganda is that the former
are not
thieves and liars.' (Minutes of security meeting held in State House,
Entebbe, 26 September 1992)
Uganda Confidential, a government mouthpiece, echoes this tribal
thinking:
'Great tribes like the Baganda thrive by assimilating other people
from other
inferior tribes, while inferior tribes diminish because of this lack
of
scientific vision and instead keep in shrinking
isolation....Similarly
superior cultures of people like the Banyarwanda....thrive because of
their
ability to modernise just like the Japanese, Chinese, etc.' (6-11
April 1994)
Museveni just happens to be from the Banyarwanda tribe.
Meanwhile, Britain has become an international public relations voice
for
Museveni. The Foreign Office is only too keen to put a moderating
gloss over
reports which expose the undemocratic and reppressive nature of the
regime:
'Under president Museveni, however, while sporadic abuses have come
to light,
in general the situation has taken a substantial turn for the better.
We
believe Museveni personally is committed to a full restoration of
human
rights and a democratic government in which all views can be freely
and
peacefully expressed. Britain's aid programme has reflected this
improvenent;
our aid is designed to reconstruct the Ugandan economy, devastated by
so many
years of civil war. It is also directed at areas which are essential
if the
state is to be fully rehabilitated, such as the police, the judiciary
and the
civil service. We have also helped the Constitutional Commission
which is
working to construct an appropriate democratic constitution for the
country.'
(Letter from H Elliot, East African Department, Foreign Office, 3
July 1990)
Referring to a letter from a Ugandan exile in London, whose mother
was burned
to death by Museveni's forces, Baroness Chalker offered her defence
of
Museveni:
'While it is true that the Acholi suffered victimisation at various
times
during the Obote and Amin regimes, this is not the case under the
NRM. The
current director of army intelligence, for example, is himself an
Acholi and
the north and east of Uganda can no longer be described as rebel-
affected
areas. While both soldiers and civilians do indulge in rape and
robberies,
the penalties are severe, and especially so for soldiers who not
infrequently
are sentenced to death if guilty of robbery with a weapon. The
fundamental
problem suffered by Uganda's population today is economic, which is
the
result of the economic destruction caused the by preceding regimes.
AIDS is
also a serious problem.... The progress of Uganda to a full plural
democracy
has still some way to go but we will continue to do what we can to
encourage
the process and to let president Museveni know if we have any
misgivings. He
can be in no doubt about our determination to support those countries
striving for sound economic management and pursuing good government
policies.' (Letter to Brian Sedgemore MP, 20 December 1993)
According to Douglas Hurd, multi-partyism is alive and well in
Museveni's
one-party state:
'Political parties have not been banned in Uganda, although their
activities
have been constrained for some time....faced with increased party
political
activity earlier this year, the National Resistance Council passed a
resolution to give legal form to the informal understanding which
limits such
activity. We and other lobbied strongly against this, and the
enacting bill
has not yet been tabled.'
And so too is respect for human rights:
'There is no doubt that abuses still occur. But we believe the
Ugandan
government is genuinely committed to maintaining better standards,
and the
situation has improved. The insurgency is all but over and the
National
Resistance Army is handing over responsibility for law and order to
the
police. Military expenditure is down, and plans are under way for a
large-scale demobilisation of National Resistance Army soldiers, to
which the
World Bank and donors (including the UK) are contributing. (Uganda
Democratic
Coalition Newsletter, Nov/Dec 1992)
Ugandans seeking refugee status in Britain have been refused on the
grounds
that Museveni has proclaimed an amnesty for exiles. The return of the
former
oppostion figure, Otema Alimadi, was used to show that Ugandan exiles
had
nothing to fear. Yet Museveni withdrew the amnesty on 12 April 1988
and
Britain continued to deport exiles to Uganda, as Apire Okot was to
find out.
He was deported and immediately arrested upon his arrival in Uganda.
He was
driven to his home village, accused of being sent to Uganda to spy
for
dissidents, tied up, beaten and left for dead by the NRA. Since the
implementation of the British Asylum and Refugees Act in mid-1993,
170
Ugandan asylum-seekers have been refused recognition.
Far from aiding the democratic process in Uganda, British
interference is the
main obstacle to the Ugandan people realising their aspiration for
democracy.
For the British government, any form of government will do in Uganda
so long
as its interests are served. When Britain talks about bringing
democracy to
Uganda, what it really means is bringing Africa under Western diktat.
The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy"
Groupe de communication Mulindwas
"avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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