(Part two)
 
LEAKED SECURITY DOCUMENT FROM MUSEVENI’S INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION

  NATIONAL THREAT CHECK LIST 1. PRA 

a)   Summary Evidence available indicates that PRA is involved in clandestine recruitment and transportation of recruits to Rwanda and parts ofEastern DRC for military training with the aim of over throwing theUganda government. The recruitment is carried out through a system of cells spread inmost parts of the Country and mainly comprised of Reform Agenda Acvtivists. They are also involved in subversive propaganda. 

b).  Intelligence requirement 

i. Identify the cells, their coordinators and financiers. 
ii.   Identify the recruiting, reception and transporting Agents. 
iii. Establish evidence of existence of PRA camps in yourAreas of operations (inside the Country), strength and Command structure. 
iv. Known people who have been recruited and taken forTraining. 
v.   Relationship with other Anti government dissident groups. 
vi. The authors, distributors and contents of the subversivepropaganda. 
vii. The border districts of Ntungamo, Kabale, Kisoro to: - •
Verify existence of PRA camps in Rwanda - locations, strength, current activity, weaponry, immediate plans, command structure and relationship with Rwanda government. 

Establish deployments of RPF along the boarder line, strength and weaponry and command structure. 

• Monitor the border points that are used by the recruiting agents to cross recruits to Rwanda and routes which are possible for our own infiltration. 
•Establish reception centres and their coordinators for recruits before crossing to Rwanda. 
• The relationship between PRA and Rwanda Government especially agents of Rwanda government who receive recruits on Rwanda side of the border. 

viii. The border districts of Kanungu, Rukungiri, Bundibugyo,Kasese, Kabarole, Hoima, Masindi, Nebbi and Arua to'.- • Verify existence of PRA camps in Eastern DRC -locations strength, current activity, and weaponry, immediate plans command and structure.

• Border points used as crossing Centres for the recruits. 
• The reception centres and their coordinators beforecrossing recruits to Eastern DRC. 
• The relationship between PRA and other armed groupssuch ADF, RCD-Goma rebels and other DRC armed rebelfactions.

 2.   LRAa.   Summary The LRA Insurgency provides the greatest security challenge to the NRM Administration, in the last 17 years. LRA operates in the three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, butkeeps on making incursions in Lira, Apac, Kotido and Adjuman. LRA has no permanent bases in Uganda but keeps on moving,depending on UPDF pressure. They have rear bases in SouthernSudan, and receive most of their Military supplies from the SudanGovernment.

Recruitment is through forced abductions of youngboys and girls who are later indoctrinated, trained and turned intofighters.    Other supplies, such as food, drugs and other essentialitems are acquired through Sudan government, looting and a well-established Network of collaborators both in Northern Uganda andKampala. 

ISO has so far failed to penetrate the ranks of LRA, mainly due tothe mode of operations, which makes it difficult to infiltrate. Thishas limited our intelligence within the group.  However through Various sources, we have managed to know, LRA command, structure, top leadership, and to a limited extent their movements and plans. LRA methods of operation and targets are fairly known, includingroutes, and the various hideouts. b).  Intelligence requirements 

i.Identify LRA collaborators in towns, trading centres andIDP camps and Kampala.
ii.   Establish supply lines for non - combat logistics. 
iii. Establish hideouts inside the country for Arms andAmmos (mainly through reporters and Prisons of Wars). 
iv.  Establish reaction of the population to rebel activities andUPDF anti rebel operations. 
v.   Monitor conduct and relationship of UPDF with the civilpopulation. 
vi. Constantly evaluate UPDF combat effectiveness andidentify any operational weakness for redress. 
vii. Reaction and opinion of the civilians especially opinion leaders on the conduct of the war. 
viii. However field officers in their respective stations shouldendeavour to establish the following: - • Actual manpower / strength. • Common routes used. • Common hideouts/ combatants. • Weapons possessed. • Morale. • What motivates and keeps LRA fighters together. • Develop DOSSIERS on all top LRA commanders. 3. 

ADF 

a) Summary Current intelligence indicates the group is based in Eastern DRC,has established good relations with local population and is notmilitarily active. There are indications some members of the groupare willing to surrender. There are however reports of recruitmentby the group inside the Country and Eastern DRC. 

b)   Intelligence requirements i.    The border districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kabaroleto: - 

• Current command structure and dossiers of the leaders- 
• Establish exact locations of the group, strength,current activity and plans. 
• Any linkage with other Ugandan dissident groups. 
• Any linkage with the various armed factions in DRC. 
• Monitor the group's willingness to surrender andwhat should be done to facilitate this development. 

ii.    The districts in Eastern, Central and Western region toestablish: ~ 

• Whether the group is involved in recruitment and if soWhat is the recruitment network? 
• Internal network that facilitates the group. 
• Involvement in urban Terrorism. 
4.
            TERRORISM

 a.   Summary Terrorism is both a National and International threat. Signals haveAlready been obtained of international terrorists with collaborationof their local network to carryout terrorist attacks in Ugandaespecially targeting USA, UK and Israel interests. 
b.   Intelligence Requirement 

i.    Identify cells / individuals / organization, suspected tobe involved in local and international terrorism. (RadicalMoslem groups, people of Arabic or Asianic origin and here particularly Sudanese's and Somali's could be monitored). 

ii.    Identify and monitor all areas frequented by suchNationals, including their local contacts. 

iii.   Establish Activities and motive of such groups/individuals. 
iv.   Identify economic interests of those targeted Nationalitiesand monitor them. 
v.    Identify possible fronts to be used by such terroristssuch as businesses, NGOs etc. 
vi.   Identify how such groups or individuals coordinate. 
vii.   Establish means, forces, plus supply lines and how theyferry in materials such as explosives. 
viii. Establish connection, if any to any local political orinsurgency groups. 
ix.   Establish common areas, of activity, and targetedPopulation for recruitment. 
x.    Establish if there is any Section of the populationSympathetic to such activity. 
xi.   What is the general population mood to such activities? 
xii.   Identify possible targets for local terrorist, such as crowded areas and monitor them. 
xiii. Evaluate our own means to fight against terrorism, through popular vigilance and the security means available.  

c.   Areas to emphasize and coverage in Uganda; ISO has general information on this threat, as far as motives local, and foreign operators, plus even local political and insurgent groups connected to terrorism. However ISO does not have enough data, on the local networks and how it relates to international terrorism, and how recruitment is done.So field stations should emphasize those networks andparticularly, in all urban centres, border points, water bodies,complexes were they handle, explosives. Foreign Economic interests, areas frequented by foreigners and crowded areas by the locals, should be seriously monitored, by recruiting Agents. 

5.  PERFORMANCE OF THE UPDF

a. Summary National Security both Internal and External depends entirely on the performance and capacity of the National Army. So it should be every body's responsibility to see how our army performs, whenever it is located. 

Each station should compile a comprehensive report on the UPDF, every month. b.   Data required should include; • Location of unit • Top leadership • Command structure and effectiveness • Troop morale to fight combat readiness • Military equipment proficiency • Regime of Security around the units. • Relationship with population. • How do the unit respond security related matters. • Supplies / logistics • Do they have a Network of Agents - intelligence circle? • Internal Administration in the unit. • Does the Army mobilize the local population? • How is the Internal Army hierarchy from this unit up toArmy headquarters? • Are there personal conflicts between the variouscommanders? c.   Areas of emphasis should include; - • Units in areas with ethnic tensions. • Units based out side Uganda, say in Sudan and Congo. • Units based on frontiers and water bodies. • Strategic Military establishment such as Nakasongola, Bihanga, Airbases etc. Field officers in such areas should be extra vigilant. 6.

POLITICAL TRENDS 

a.   Summary There are Political developments taking p ace that are likelyto affect the future stability of the country. Key among these developments include: - Opening up of Political space and therefore various political organisations are to compete for power. These include: - - Democratic Party - (DP) and Uganda Young Democrats - (UYD). - Uganda Peoples Congress - (UPC) - Reform Agenda (RA). - Conservative Party - (CP) - Jema - Any other political party/pressure group that may emerge. Demand for federal status especially by former kingdom areas like Buganda, Busoga, Toro and Bunyoro. Ethnic / tribal tensions in some parts of the countryespecially land wrangles in Bunyoro. b. Intelligence requirements 

i.   All field officers to: - • Monitor and develop dossiers of the key personalities in these organisations. " Monitor Internal Contradiction with in these groups. • Establish points of strength. • Identify Areas where each organization has support andthose they are targeting.  10 • Identify and monitor Alliances among the variousgroups and intentions. • Establish un constitutional means being used / or beingPlanned by any of the group to tale over power. 

• Relationship with foreign countries especially thoseconsidered hostile to Uganda. • Source of funding especially external. ii.   Field officers in Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, Tooro,Ankole to specifically monitor political developmentsspecifically in their respective stations. 

7.  CITIZEN DATABASE AND PROFILES a).   Summary Each district should start to collect, and arrange data, on citizen,especially on people who matter.  This should be routine andcontinuous, as the information keeps on changing. b).  Intelligence requirements ii.   Develop dossiers of leading personalities in your areas ofoperation such as but not limited to :- - RDC's - LC V Council - LC III Council - Area MPs - Area Ministers - Army official - Police officials 

 
            The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy"
            Groupe de communication Mulindwas
"avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"

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